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"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser
to select what he wants, or what he had been led to believe he
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the
means employed, the end is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-
mark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the
commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can
obtain legal redress." Frankfurter, J., in Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.'
The law of trade symbols is of modem development, largely judge-
made and only partly codified.2 Its impetus comes from the demands of
t Reprinted from Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948). Bracketed page references indicate original
pagination.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). Short-titles to be used in this article are: BORDEN, for N.H.
BORDEN, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADvERTISING (1942); CALLMANN, for CALLMANN, LAW
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (1945).
2. Though the beginnings are remote, see SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW RELATING TO TRADE MARKS (1925), the significant development has occurred within the
last century. For the judicial creation of the varied torts of unfair competition, including trade
symbol law, see Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1936); Chafee, Unfair
Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1289 (1940). Previous federal trade-mark legislation was thought
to afford only procedural advantages; for the handful of substantive rights created by the new
Lanham Act, 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (Supp. 1947), see Diggins, The
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147 (1947). State statutes are of minor importance; see
DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 468-87 (1936); but see note 121
infra.
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modem advertising, a black art3 whose practitioners are part of [1166] the
larger army which employs threats, cajolery, emotions, personality,
persistence and facts in what is termed aggressive selling. Much aggressive
selling involves direct personal relationships; advertising depends on the
remote manipulation of symbols, most importantly of symbols directed at a
mass audience through mass media, or imprinted on mass-produced goods.
The essence of these symbols is distilled in the devices variously called
trade-marks, trade names, brand names, or trade symbols. To the courts
come frequent claims for protection, made by those who say they have
fashioned a valuable symbol, and that no one else should use it. Very
recently, for example, the vendors of Sun-Kist oranges lost a court battle to
prevent an llinois baker from selling Sun-Kist bread.4 The highest court, in
its most recent encounter with a like case, upheld the power of a
manufacturer of rubber footwear to prevent the use of a red circle mark by a
seller of rubber heels, which the plaintiff did not manufacture.5
In these cases, a choice of premises and techniques is still open. One set
of premises, which seems to subsume Justice Frankfurter's felicitous
dictum, recognizes a primary public interest in protecting the seller who
asks the court to enjoin "another [who] poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of a symbol he has created." This expansive conception merits
critical attention. Are all forms of poaching forbidden? Should they be,
consistent with another premise? This one asserts, in the words of Judge
Frank, "the basic common law policy of encouraging competition, and the
fact that the protection of monopolies in names is but a secondary and
limiting policy." 6 The legal ties which bind together some apparently
inconsistent decisions may be found, but not simply in an indiscriminate
prohibition of poaching, nor yet in a presumption in favor of competition,
no matter how compelling. Rather, courts move from these and other
premises to refinements of doctrine.
It is proposed here to seek, in the milieu in which trade symbols are
created and used, for data underlying both premises and dogma. This will
require an independent evaluation of the institution of advertising. What do
3. Cf. L. HAND, J., in Proceedings in Memory of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. xi, xv
(1942): "... . the art of publicity is a black art; but it has come to say, every year adds to is potency
and to the finality of its judgments. The hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-
spread magazine, rules the country; whether we like it or not, we must learn to accept it."
4. California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (C.C.A. 7th
1947).
5. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942), quoted
supra. The opinion of the court dealt only with a technical point of accountability for profits. The
dissent (the court split 4-3, with two justices not participating) questioned the plaintiff's right to
any relief beyond an injunction.
6. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 959 (C.C.A. 2d 1943) cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
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we get for the three billions of current annual outlay?7 Do [1167] we want
it? Unfortunately, there is little consensus as to what values advertising
serves. Its votaries have poured their most skillful symbols back in the soil
from which they sprang.' Its detractors, maddened by the success of this
propaganda, would purge Radio City with fire and sword.9 One thing the
examination will reveal is that what appear to be private disputes among
hucksters almost invariably touch the public welfare. We shall therefore be
concerned to ask, when courts protect trade symbols, whether their
decisions further public as well as private goals.
I. TRADE SYMBOLS AND THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING
The principal reason for advertising is an economic one' ° to sell
goods and services. We can describe this process, and its economic effects,
with relative confidence,' compared to the obscurity which [11681
7. The total cost of advertising can only be estimated. The most authoritative estimates have
been those of the late Dr. L. D. H. Weld, published annually in Printer's Ink. According to his
figures, the outlay reached $2.6 billions in 1929, and then fell to $1.3 billions in 1933. See
tabulation in FREY, ADVERTISING 6 (1947). The 1929 figure was not passed until 1946, $3.0
billions. For 1947 the total increased sharply to $3.9 billions. 223 PRINTER'S INK 28 (April 30,
1948). However, the recent figures, when compared to those of the '20s and '30s, represent a
decreased ratio to the general level of economic activity, as indicated by national income indices.
An uncertain but appreciable part of the increasing cost of packaging retail goods (estimated at
about $5 billions for 1947; see 36 FORTUNE 246 (Nov. 1947)) is not but should be included in the
cost of advertising; see VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 300 (1923). The contribution of
advertising to periodicals and radio, which accordingly reach the public either "free" or at a
reduced price, is often thought of as a substantial offset, especially by those who neglect to
consider the increase in costs (e.g. for newsprint, disc jockeys) caused by the advertising. Borden
made a painstaking analysis of 1935 and estimated that, from total advertising outlays of $1.7
billions, $377,000,000 were available to newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting after deducting
costs attributable to the advertising. BORDEN 68-71.
8. E.g., CALKINS, BUSINESs THE CIVILIZER (1928); SOKOLSKY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LIFE (1939).
9. A long list of books exposing the untruths and frauds of advertising was dominated by
CHASE AND SCHLINK, YOUR MONEY'S WORTH (1927), and KALLET AND SCHLINCK,
100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS (1933). See SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 9, 11 (1941).
Noteworthy among general attacks on the institution was RORTY, OUR MASTER'S VOICE (1934).
Current output is slight; see CLARK, THE ADVERTISING SMOKE SCREEN (1944); WAKEMAN, THE
HUCKSTERS (1946).
10. There are important non-economic or mixed motives for advertising; but they have been
insufficiently explored to warrant comment. A listing of several may be suggestive:
(1) Self-aggrandizement of the advertiser. A revealing handbook, GOODE, ADVERTISING 16
(3d ed. 1941) states that "the advertiser's motive ... may-and justly-be either primarily for
self-expression or primarily to sell goods."
(2) Institutional inertia-because everyone else does.
(3) Tax considerations-the government will pay for it anyway.
(4) Political considerations-to influence public opinion on issues which only indirectly
affect the economic welfare of the advertiser.
11. The most extensive study of the economics of advertising is BORDEN, The ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING (1942), referred to herein as BORDEN. It was sponsored by the
Advertising Research Foundation and executed at the Harvard Business School. Its stated
premises are pro-advertising; the data are scrupulously presented. I have felt free to rely on it, as a
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surrounds the psychological, cultural, or other social consequences of
modem advertising. These may turn out to be more portentous than the
affairs of the market-place. But the materials are uncollected or unrefined.
In this survey we can only drop a handful of problems into a footnote."z The
reader must make his own judgments from his own observations,
remembering, as we turn almost exclusively to economic discussion, that
man does not live by bread alone.
Infonnative and Persuasive Advertising
The buying public submits to a vast outpouring of words and pictures
from the advertisers, in which, mingled with exhortations to buy, is a
modicum of information about the goods offered. From the point of view of
the economic purist, imparting information is the only useful function of
advertising.13 A perfect market demands a perfect enlightenment of those
who buy and sell. One of the many imperfections of the real world is that,
absent advertising, most buyers would have to go to a great deal of trouble
to discover that is offered for sale.14 To the extent that the blandishments of
sellers inform buyers what is to be bought, and at what price, advertising
undoubtedly helps to quicken the stream of commerce."
scholarly moderate case for persuasive advertising, and to differ with some of its conclusions.
Most books on advertising are trade manuals or textbooks which grapple inadequately with
disputed major issues; see, however, A.W. FREY, ADVERTISING 654-731 (1947).
12. Social psychology textbooks have little or nothing to say about the effects of persuasive
advertising on personality. Yet the possibilities for investigation are numerous. For example, to
what extent does creation of wants which the consumer cannot satisfy increase or decrease
frustration and insecurity? See LYNDE AND LYND, MIDDLETOWN, c. viii (1929) "Why Do they
Work So Hard?". Has the pre-emption by the advertiser "of the common value-symbols of our
culture, the symbols of courage, of beauty, of domesticity, of patriotism, of happiness, and even of
religion, for the purposes of selling," led to altered attitudes toward the values themselves? See
Hayakawa, Poetry and Advertising, 3 ETC. 116, 119 (1946). A check of PSYCHOLOGICAL
ABSTRACTS for the period 1937-46, s.v. Advertising, reveals nothing but applied research directed
to commercial results. And what of "the workings of advertising upon language and manners and
character" ? See William McFee, quoted in CHASE, THE TRAGEDY OF WASTE 122(1925).
13. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE 304-7 (1927); PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
196-9 (4th ed. 1938). Cf CHERINGTON, THE CONSUMER LOOKS AT ADVERTISING 186 (1928)
(author was Director of Research for J. Walter Thompson Co.): "I even wonder at times whether
there is any economic justification for any advertising which cannot meet one simple test: Is it
designed to make the final consumer a more competent buyer?
"When we get away from a comparatively simple conception of advertising like this, we at
once get into trouble try to justify it on economic grounds."
14. Sellers are in possibly worse straits when they commit resources to production with
imperfect knowledge of probable demand; however, improved techniques of marketing research
are making increasing quantities of data available. See generally, BLANKENSHIP, CONSUMER AND
OPINION RESEARCH (1943); L.O. BROWN, MARKET RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (1937).
15. "Its chief function is to educate.... This view of the economic value of advertising rests
upon the premise that information about goods and sen'ices is in itself an economic utility."
Hotchkiss, An Economic Defense of Advertising, 15 AM. ECON. REV. StPp. 14, 18 (1925).
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[1169] Most advertising, however, is designed not to inform, but to
persuade and influence. 6 What is the occasion for such tremendous outlays
on persuasion and influence in a well-ordered economic system? If we
consider first the total stream of production and consumption, persuasive
advertising seems only to consume resources that might be put to better use
producing more goods and services. It does not increase total demand, it
only increases wants. Effective demand arises, not from what we would like
to have, but from the purchasing power of the community created by its
productive power. We consume what we produce, and no more.
Considering the economic welfare of the community as a whole, to use up
part of the national product persuading people to buy product A rather than
product B appears to be a waste of resources.
Perhaps advertising helps to produce more, if it goads people to work
longer and harder. 7 At first blush, this seems a moral and salutary
prescription. On second thought, one realizes that more work and more
goods means less leisure. Are we interested only in greater possessions? In
its own right, and as a time to consume the fruits of labor, leisure is highly
prized. Somehow a balance has to be struck between work and play, but the
degree of discontent which the advertisers can create is not the way to do
it.'
5
[1170] In any case, there is a system for multiplying both goods and
leisure which has been in operation for some time with some success. It
consists of putting savings to work in the form of machines, and is called
16. Statistical verification is necessarily imprecise. However, "detailed tabulations to
establish the truth of this statement are not necessary". BORDEN 665. For a typical attempt, see
WArriE AND CASSADY, THE CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 166 (1939) (analysis of 800
magazine advertisements: 15% informative, 85% persuasive). But cf. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
ADVERTISING AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER RELATIONS IN ADVERTISING,
INFORMATION IN ADVERTISING II (1946). The difficulty of drawing a firm line between
informative and persuasive advertising does not impair the conclusion that most advertising
conveys few useful facts about either the goods and services or their origin. A statement of the
informative functions of trade symbols is attempted p. 1185 infra. Advertising, especially on
labels, can provide much fuller descriptive data than can symbols, which are only guideposts. See
M.G. REID, CONSUMERS AND THE MARKET c. XXVI (3d ed. 1942). Industrial advertising,
directed at trained buyers unresponsive to emotional appeals, is often cited as a model of
information without embellishment. But see Duncan, What Motivates Business Buyers, 18 HARV.
Bus. REv. 448 (1940).
17. Thus, a mine manager in a foreign country is said to have stimulated his indolent
employees by presenting them with Sears-Roebuck catalogues. Phillips, The Role of Non-Price
Competition, in CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRICING PROBLEMS AND THE
STABILIZATION OF PROSPERITY 60,70 (1947).
For an historical approach to the influence of consumption standards on production, see
Gilboy, Demand as a Factor in the Industrial Revolution, in FACTS AND FACTORS IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 620 (1932).
18. It may be argued that greater output can be achieved in a shorter time, given the incentive.
This is otherwise known as the "speedup" and by other invidious terms. The worker who
exhausts himself to get everything in the Sears catalogue may not enjoy his possessions much. In
any case, the problem reduces to one of choice (pp. 1182 infra) between an over-advertised good
(money) and a less advertised one (leisure).
The Yale Law Journal
capitalism, or the Industrial Revolution, or whatever label is politically
pleasing. If the process of capital investment is at all affected by
advertising, that relationship is far more important to explore than the
unsatisfactory proposition that advertising increases production by making
people work more.
Any possible connection between advertising and capital investment is
especially worth pursuing, because the new economics has taught us that if
the rate of additions to or replacements of capital equipment declines, total
production and income will also decline, and to a much greater extent. The
level of production is a function of the level of investment, and the level of
investment is a function of the expectations of enterprisers. 19 People do not
start new businesses or expand old ones unless they think they see a profit
in it, and that is where advertising comes in. To pursue the relation between
persuasive advertising and profits, we shall have to make our way through
the thickets of monopolistic competition and the slough of mass-production
cost economies. Whatever profit advantages advertising offers spring
chiefly from these two sources. Only after exploring them can we consider
whether profits, so derived, facilitate the total flow of investment.
Market Control and Differentiation
How does the privilege of an entrepreneur to spend money on
advertising increase the likelihood of profit at all, in a system described by
its proponents as one of free competition? The competitive system, after all,
postulates many sellers offering uniform products to many buyers. For any
good, at a given time, there is a single market price, at which any seller can
sell all he chooses to produce, i.e., all that it is profitable for him to
produce. In a pure economy, advertising outlays (except for information to
make the market more nearly perfect) would only add to the costs, and
decrease the profit, of any firm.2"
It is easy to escape from this dilemma by reminding ourselves that pure
competition is descriptive only of an ideal, not of the real world.21 [1171]
We have long since settled for such compromise goals as "workable"
competition,' which take account of the fact that actual markets are a blend
19. The doctrines here crudely summarized from KEYNEs, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936), can now be found in elementary textbooks: e.g.
TARSHIS, THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS, pt. IV (1947); T. MORGAN, INCOME AND
EMPLOYMENT (1947). As stated in the text, they of course require a broadly qualifying "other
things being equal," especially as regards the propensity to consume.
20. MEADE AND HITCH, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYsIs AND POLICY 176
(1940).
21. See, e.g., COMPETITON AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph
21, 1940).
22. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (1940).
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of competitive and monopolistic elements, reflecting the unwillingness of
men of business to sell at prices impersonally determined. The term
"monopolistic" means only the acquisition of any degree of control over a
market, either as regards price or entry. 3 Most entrepreneurs strive to
achieve some degree of control, for it enables them to have a price policy
directed at maximizing profits, instead of leaving all to the chances of a
competitive market.24 They seek to escape from competition in two
principal ways: (1) By dominating the market, either through a loose or
close-knit combination of firms, or by the growth of a single firm.
Examples are steel, shoe machinery,26 aluminum.' The main drive of the
antitrust laws is to retard this trend.2" (2) By differentiating their products,
in order to carve out a separate market in which demand, price, and output
can be manipulated within limits to be discussed.29 The main drive of
advertising is to facilitate this latter form of control.
[1172] The process may be exemplified by the familiar case of
cigarettes, which shows clearly how differentiation serves to increase the
price of an advertised article, relative to the prices of substitutes.3" Taking
23. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937). Any form of the word
"monopoly" has unavoidable emotional associations. My intention is to use it as descriptive of
business structures which are widely prevalent. The reader must decide for himself whether the
apparent consequences make him happy or sad. Furthermore, the adjective "monopolistic"
reflects a technical controversy among economists. See White, A Review of Monopolistic and
Imperfect Competition Theories, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 637, 642 (1936). The concept of
"monopolistic competition" as employed here is intended in the sense prescribed by Professor
Chamberlin, note 29 infra.
24. It cannot be over-emphasized that the ability of a firm to have a price policy other than
willingness or unwillingness to sell at a market price is evidence that competition is not free of
monopoly elements. The variety and complexity of price policy is suggested by HAMILTON AND
ASSOCIATES, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1938); Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large-
Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REv. SuPp. 61 (1939); Nourse, The Meaning of "Price Policy",
55 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1941).
25. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); Amended complaint,
FTC Docket 5508, American Iron and Steel Institute, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 13,641 (1947.
26. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); Complaint,
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., Civil 7198, CCH TRADE REG. REP. ('48-'51
Court Decisions) 61,093 (D. Mass. 1947).
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (C.C.A. 2d 1945). Misuse of
the patent laws has in recent years also assumed the proportions of a major escape; see
OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAwS, 477 et seq. (1948).
28. Levi, The Anti-trust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 153 (1947); Rostow, The
New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, id at 567.
29. This classification, and the analysis which follows, rest on the theoretical foundation
provided by CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (5th ed. 1946).
Though controversy exists over some aspects of Professor Chamberlin's teaching, its main
outlines do not require documentation. They are accepted in BORDEN, c. VI, contrary to the
reviewer who exulted that, "Neil Borden today invalidates the thesis of Edward Chamberlin,
demonstrating the fallacies in the theory of monopolistic competition." Gardner, The Business
View of Advertising Policy, 6 J. OF MARKETING, pt. I, 112, 115 (1942).
30. I ignore without apology the interesting definitional problems, what is an industry, a
product, a substitute? Though economists must resort to such terms as "nebulous" in referring to
the concept of an industry, and "good" or "poor" in referring to substitutes for a product, see
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the industry as a whole, heavy advertising may first make consumers more
willing than they would otherwise be to pay the prices set for cigarettes, and
to forego such alternative satisfactions as cigars, candy, and sodas. Thus the
total consumer outlay for cigarettes may be increased, to the benefit of both
advertising and non-advertising manufacturers."
Benefit to the advertiser alone comes with the preference he is able to
establish for his brand over unadvertised brands. If this preference
translated into price is more than the outlays on advertising required to
accomplish the persuasion, differentiation is profitable. How profitable it is
for the advertised brands of cigarettes is indicated by the price policy of the
leading companies in the thirties. During the period of greatest rivalry with
what were then ten-cent cigarettes, the Big Three could maintain a three-
cent difference in retail price per pack and still hold unadvertised
competition in check. The cost of advertising was not more than a cent a
pack; the tobacco used in the standard brands cost about half a cent a pack
more than that in the economy brands. Thus less than a cent and a half in
costs brought in three cents in revenue.32 The famous blindfold tests raised
doubts whether smokers could actually tell one brand from another, even as
between standard and economy brands.33 But, from the point of view of the
advertiser as well as that of the economist, whether the differentiation is
real or spurious does not affect the result.' The only necessity is for buyers
[1173] to believe that there is a difference, and to be willing to pay to
satisfy the preference created for the advertised product. Their willingness
establishes the degree of market control.
Even if the main drive of advertising is to decrease competition, what
about the frequent fierce rivalry between advertisers? Is that not
competition? Emphatically, it is not, in any economically useful sense of
the word. The only kind of competition contemplated by the major cigarette
STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE 238, 280 (1947), theorists, entrepreneurs, and consumers can all have
workable notions, even if they cannot define them.
31. BORDEN 207-49, 492-6, 535-49 discusses the effect of advertising on demand, cost and
price of cigarettes. He concludes that, so far as primary demand is concerned (for cigarettes as a
product), advertising chiefly speeded up a favorable trend otherwise created. It has, however, been
highly effective in diverting selective demand (from brand to brand).
32. Il at 444, 546. Advertising outlays amounted to 10-20% of net sales, less excise taxes.
The figure on cost of tobacco is drawn from data for 1941-42, the first reliable material available.
OFFICE OF TEMPORARY CONTROLS, OPA ECONOMIC DATA SERIES NO. 21, SURVEY OF
TOBACCO PRODUCT MANUFACTURERS 6 (1948). In 1941, manufacturers' net margin averaged
1.3 cents per pack for standard brands, 0.1 cents per pack for economy brands. 1bid.
33. BuRTr, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 370 (1938).
34. Claude Hopkins, whose autobiography is revered in advertising circles, described an early
success in these terms: Van Camp's pork and beans offered no unique arguments. They were like
other pork and beans. When we met in the factory and served half a dozen brands, not a man
present could decide which was Van Camp's. But we told facts which no one else ever told... we
centered our attack on the weak spots, made Van Camp's seem the one way out. And we created
an enormous demand. Not only that, but the Van Camp's brand commanded a much higher price
than our rivals'." HOPKINS, MY LIFE IN ADVERTISING 101-3 (1927).
1626 [Vol. 108:1619
1999] Advertising and the Public Interest 1627
manufacturers is competition for a higher degree of monopoly power, for a
larger share of a market which is already insulated from the price
competition of non-advertisers." The uniformity of price among advertised
products like cigarettes is not the uniformity of a perfectly competitive
market. It is a price set by price leadership or by tacit agreement among a
few sellers, and it is high enough for the advertisers to spend large sums in
attempting to divert customers from one another. If the number of
advertising sellers is large, as is the case with medicines, 6 there may be no
uniformity of price. But the differences reflect the varying exploitation by
each seller of his differentiated market, and only rarely the incidence of
price competition. What price a competitive market would bring is
suggested for almost any drug by the spread between the advertised product
and its unheralded chemical equivalent. The standard example is aspirin; in
1938 an ounce of acetylsalicylic acid at wholesale cost $.13; an ounce of
Bayer Aspirin, $.75. Other advertised brands trailed after Bayer.37
[1174] In between the extremes of industry organization (few sellers,
one product; many sellers, many products) lies a gamut of permutations; but
the common element, wherever there are successful advertisers, is a trend
away from one or more characteristics of a competitive market.38
35. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), upheld a conviction of the
three major cigarette companies under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Both the Supreme Court
opinion and that of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 147 F.2d 93 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944), contain valuable
material on the coordinated activity of the majors to subdue the competition of the unadvertised
brands, and on their heavy use of advertising, first to accomplish minor diversions of demand
from each other, and second to retain their dominant position in the industry. All these conditions
have continued despite the successful prosecution, In 1947 the three leading brands had 80.2% of
the domestic market, the three leading companies 84.7% of total cigarette sales. Unadvertised
cigarettes seem almost to have disappeared; the rest of the market is held by minor advertised
brands (Philip Morris, Old Gold, etc.). Business Week, Jan. 17, 1948, p. 42.
36. The census reported 1,094 manufacturers of drugs and medicines in 1939. 2 BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, MANUFACTURES 1939, pt. 1, 771(1942). "No other business deals in so great a
number of trademark articles." 31 T.M. REP. 13 (1941).
37. NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 81, 371 (TNEC
Monograph 1, 1940); BORDEN 576-8. Many similar instances are reported in these references. In a
recent case, the producer of "Benzedrine" sued a seller of the chemical equivalent, amphetamine
sulphate, alleging deceptive imitation of appearance of the tablets. In dismissing, the court said,
"It appears from the affidavits that defendant is able to market its amphetamine sulphate tablets at
approximately one-tenth the price that is charged by the plaintiff.., that is perhaps the plaintiff's
main grievance." Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Waldman, 69 F.Supp. 646, 649 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
38. Another advantage of differentiation is quite valuable in an unstable economy. Since
demand for each seller's product becomes less elastic, i.e. relatively unaffected by changes in
price, the price of a differentiated article need not fall so far or so fast in bad times as would a
comparable competitive price. BORDEN 850-1 summarizes the considerable evidence derived
from the price rigidity of many differentiated brands during the depression. The major cigarette
companies, in a remarkable episode, even increased prices in 1931. Liggett & Myers officials felt
that the rise, initiated by Reynolds, was a mistake, "but they contended that unless they also
raised their list price for Chesterfields, the other companies would have greater resources to spend
in advertising and thus would put Chesterfield cigarettes at a competitive disadvantage." United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. 781, 805 (1946). The concept of competition implicit
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The achievement of profitable differentiation by persuasive advertising
is not an automatic process. Attempts by firms or industries to do so have
often failed.39 Borden concludes that if demand in general for the product is
declining, advertising cannot reverse the trend. Cigars are a standard
example. Further, there are still many goods so defiantly homogenous that
not all the ad-man's magic can persuade the public that one brand is
different from another. Sugar is a case in point; the producers, unable to
achieve monopoly power through advertising, turned to conspiracy."n At the
other extreme, some articles-for example women's dresses or fresh
vegetables-flaunt their differences so self-evidently that attempts to
establish brand preferences are practically useless. In between is a wide
range in which artful or blatant persuasion can compound from a few real
differences a dizzy variety of brands, each with its loyal band of buyers4"
whose demand schedules have been mesmerized into inelasticity. The
competition to create such a monopolized market is often so fierce that, as
will be shown, brands jostle for attention and their effects sometimes cancel
out.
But the histories of a host of consumers' goods-packaged foods,
[1175] cosmetics, kitchen appliances, to mention only a few major fields-
are proof that it does pay to advertise, that it pays in higher prices and
higher profits than if the product was in undifferentiated competition with
like products in a competitive market.
Unit Cost Economies
Another supposed major advantage is that advertising, by increasing
sales, enables the firm to reach lower unit costs, resulting from the
increased efficiency of large-scale operation, and from the spreading of
fixed costs over a greater number of units.4" The attainment of output
in this candid admission speaks for itself. After the increase, volume of sales declined, but profits
did not. Ibid. Cf STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE (1947) 239-40.
39. The examples which follow are drawn from BORDEN c. XVI.
40. BORDEN 284; The Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
41. Brand loyalties may be established by the influence of advertising, the attributes of the
product, or by other tendencies to buy. Once established, all the motives for buying a brand may
reinforce each other until buyers "build up so strong a loyalty-for which the emotional bases are
usually quite obscure-that they are convinced that Chesterfields, for example, are the best, and
will try to rationalize their choice. It has become an autonomous habit to associate Chesterfield's
well-established name, package, and advertising with the idea or act of buying cigarettes." Allen,
A Psychology of Motivation for Advertisers, 25 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 378, 383 (1941).
42. If one accepts the further claim (not necessarily warranted under conditions of
monopolistic competition) that lower costs will result in lower prices, the public will also benefit.
Compare SANDAGE, ADVERTISING THEORY AND PRACTICE 26 (1939) with LEVER, ADVERTISING
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 94 (1947).
Note the progression, in the following oft-quoted statement, from guarded premise to
unbridled conclusion: "When General Foods first took over the Jell-O Company, Jell-O was
selling to the consumer for an average of 120 per package. Today the prevailing price is around
1628 [Vol. 108: 1619
1999] Advertising and the Public Interest 1629
compatible with lowest costs will be automatic in a classically competitive
market.43 However, we accept the facts of life. In a differentiated market,
like that for soap, advertising may run to twenty per cent or more of the
manufacturer's selling price4 and to multi-million annual expenditures by
single companies.45 A soap manufacturer who wants to sell soap either
accepts a very low price in the face of extreme brand preferences,46 or
commissions a set of soap operas. As the result of advertising he may get a
share of the market which approaches the most efficient capacity of a soap
factory. Aside from the unfortunate [1176] fact that little material is
available on the optimum size of plants, soap or otherwise, 47 there is even
less to suggest that advertising is directed toward achieving any such level
of sales. In theory, the producer bent on maximizing profits will, under
conditions of monopolistic competition, tend to hold down output short of
most efficient capacity. In practice, he may not know what his most
profitable output is, and, if advertising has opened the market sufficiently,
may produce far beyond the point either of maximum profits or of lowest
average costs.48 In any case, the extreme diversity of possible and actual
cost situations makes generalization especially difficult. Even if it were
possible to construct accurate cost curves for some sample cases, the
question would still remain whether any economies achieved by an increase
in production exceeded the selling costs49 incurred by advertising (or other
5V20 to 60 per package. The decrease in price has been made possible only by successive increases
in output, and the successive increases in output have been made possible, partly at least, through
advertising. The total advertising cost at the present time is under one-half of a cent per package-
that's wrong with advertising when it works that way? ... Could the price of Jell-O have come
down without advertising? If so, I would like to know how!" Francis, A Challenge to Marketing
Men, 3 J. OF MARKETNG 27, 31 (1938).
43. CHAMfBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, c. II (5th ed. 1946).
44. BORDEN 443, Table 105. See the case history of Rinso, id. at 93-5, 454-5. Lever Bros. set
the price to match that of other powdered soaps, which allowed a wide margin for advertising
outlays. These were boldly undertaken, and at first were more than 50% of sales value. In a few
years sales volume had increased to the point where the same total advertising outlay (about
$1,200,000 annually) amounted to only 20% of sales value. The venture was not immediately
profitable, but soon became so.
45. Procter and Gamble makes the largest expenditures in magazines and radio of any
advertiser-23,665,000 in 1947. The other two dominant soap companies are fourth and sixth in
the same ranking. 223 PRNTER's INK 82 (1948). The three largest companies probably have 80%
of the business; see 19 FORTuNE 77, 82 (Apr. 1939).
46. See BORDEN 596-7 for an account of a large retail chain, which could buy an
unadvertised brand of powdered soap at 60% of the wholesale price of rinso or Oxydol, and sell it
for 14 cents a package as against 19 cents for the advertised brands, retaining a wider margin than
on the advertised brands. The chain's executives were not sure that it would sell, even at a 30%
price advantage.
47. See RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED AND SMALL BusINEsS (TNEC
Monograph 13, 1941). The common identification of large size with efficiency is meeting
increasingly critical examination. See Symposium, Does Large-Scale Enterprise Result in Low
Costs?, 38 AM. ECON. REV. SurP. 121 (1948).
48. See LEVER, ADVERTISING AND ECONOMIC THEORY cc. 9, 12 (1947).
49. The conventional separation of production costs from selling costs should not overlook
the fact that the market process involves many costs necessary to create desired space-time
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aggressive selling devices). Borden decided that the evidence is
inconclusive." As a general proposition, then, we cannot say that
advertising increases profits (or reduces prices) by decreasing costs, though
it may do so in some instances.
One special case of importance is that of a product in an early stage of
development, with very limited sales. Its price almost invariably decreases
as large-scale production is achieved. If the good is one which is
extensively advertised, it is argued that advertising is responsible for the
increase in sales and therefore for the decrease in price. The mechanical
refrigerator is a conspicuous example.5 Such instances ignore the
possibility that demand for a meritorious product might spring from its
merits. No one doubts that hand-made refrigerators cost more than mass-
produced refrigerators, and that a volume of demand was necessary to make
mass-production feasible. Did advertising create the demand? Or was it
advertising plus the desirability of the product, plus the improvements in
quality, reliability, etc., that one expects from time and effort? It is worth
noting that once strong brand preferences had been created in the
refrigerator field, the remarkable [1177] price reductions that had marked
the development period came to an end, and from about 1933 to 1940 prices
were relatively stable, though sales continued to increase. In the latter year,
with the market at the old prices pretty well saturated, the introduction of
"stripped-down" models touched off another round of price competition,
unfortunately terminated by war and inflation.52
That advertising (or aggressive selling generally) may speed up the
growth in demand for mechanical refrigerators or any other innovation is
not doubted. The refrigerator caught on in a decade, while our rude
forebears might have gone without ice cubes for a generation. Such
acceleration is presumably a good in itself, and is a legitimate boon to the
investor. Business men, advisedly, take short views. A project which will
pay off its development costs in five years is more attractive in an unstable
world than one requiring ten, even if the long-run profit prospect is the
same for both. Both the information and influence functions of advertising
help a new venture catch on, and thus shorten the period of uneconomic
small-scale production. In the growth stage, they may, besides rapidly
utilities. These distribution costs should be distinguished from selling costs incurred by the seller,
in Chamberlin's terms, "to alter the position or shape of the demand curve for a product."
CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 117 (5th ed. 1946). The theoretical
analysis of the effect of selling costs is almost as complex as the practical difficulties of cost-
accounting and of determining the effect of advertising on sales, competitors' reactions, etc. IM. c.
VI; Buchanan, Advertising Expenditures: A Suggested Treatment, 50 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1942).
50. BORDEN 524.
51. BORDEN c. XV gives the history of the promotion of the mechanical refrigerator.
52. Id at571.
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enlarging demand, increase its elasticity, so that the market will respond
rewardingly to price reductions. 3
Advertising and Investment- Conclusions
The catalytic action of advertising on new enterprises brings us back to
a point of departure: the question whether advertising stimulates capital
goods outlays. Profit, we know, is the bait for investment; and competition
involves uncertainty. Without, for the moment, questioning these
incomplete axioms, let us consider a hypothetical prudent capitalist who
proposes to launch a new washing machine. He faces, among others, two
major hazards: consumers may not know they want it, and competitors may
crowd in and sell it cheaper than he would like. Advertising can solve both
problems. First, it can stimulate demand for the product-the new,
electronic, waterless washing machine. Second, it can develop a secondary
demand for the promoter's own brand-the new Synchro-Dyne electronic
waterless washing machine; accept no substitutes. So far as the advertising
describes something new it serves, as we have seen, a function useful to
both seller and community. The probability of protected profits, however, is
the major attraction to the entrepreneur. A differentiated brand, like a
patent, a secret process, control over distribution channels or control of raw
materials, is a safeguard against the risks of competition. All these devices
may encourage investment by those who are [1178] able to take advantage
of them. Therefore, it is argued, we must look on them with tolerance; a
considerable degree of monopoly power, we are told, is not a bad thing, but
a social necessity to keep the river of capital funds flowing.54
It is quite likely that observation of the investment process would show
extensive reliance on anti-competitive arrangements. If they exist and are
profitable, one would hardly expect them to be overlooked. Whether total
investment is thereby increased is a different and dubious matter. If the
industry is one in which entry is easy and differentiation feasible and not
already fully exploited-furniture seems to be a current example 5 --
additional investment in that industry may be induced by the hope of
monopoly profits. But does this represent investment which would not
otherwise be made? It is possible that it will simply be diverted from
industries which are less profitable because they are more competitive.
53. Id. at 437. An increase in elasticity during the growth period occurs when an increasing
number of consumers learn about, want, and then buy the article as the price comes down. This is
not inconsistent with the inelasticity which advertising of established products fosters. See note 38
supra.
54. This point of view is most persuasively put by SCHuMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 87-92 (2d ed. 1947). But cf Abramovitz, Savings and Investment, 32 AM.
ECON. REV. SuPp. No. 2, TNEC Papers, 53, 81-6 (1942).
55. See Buckingham, Battle of the Brands, 39 ADV. & SELLING 96 (June 1946).
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Further, does not the protection of one person's investment in the
manner suggested, imply the suppression of investment by others? 6 The
possibility is most clearly seen in industries in which heavy advertising
differentiation has accompanied a high degree of concentration. It is not
difficult to imagine that an aspiring cigarette manufacturer, confronted by
the Big Three and their satellites, would be deterred by the large outlays
necessary for advertising,57 and by the inefficacy, already sketched, of pure
price competition. If investment relies on market control, which sooner or
later requires restrictions on entry, where is the freedom in free enterprise?
The investigations necessary to strike a quantitative balance between
investment encouraged and investment discouraged by monopoly devices
of any sort do not exist, and the theoretical investigations are sketchy. It
seems fair to say that we have no evidence that advertising stimulates the
total flow of investment, except through its accelerating effect on the
growth period of new enterprises."
[1179] In fact, so long as the control of prices and profits available to
successful advertisers does attract new capital to an industry, serious
misallocation of resources and the ultimate disappearance of monopoly
profits is likely to follow. A competitive price system supposedly purges
inefficient producers. When price and output are influenced by advertising,
the structure of the industry approaches the optimum only by coincidence.
In the Canadian baking industry, with high prices supported by collusion
and advertising, thousands of inefficient small bakers exist under the price
umbrella, while the large units have excess capacity.59 In the rubber tire
industry, contrariwise, the smaller units are the more efficient, but
56. See T. MORGAN, INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 207-8 (1947); PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 207-8 (4th ed. 1938).
57. See BORDEN 232-3 for conjectures about the outlays required to launch the Old Gold and
Philip Morris brands.
58. Even if advertising had no important effect on investment, perhaps it can compensate for
a declining investment rate by increasing the propensity to consume, a measure which the under-
consumptionist school recommends as a cure for "oversaving." The advertising economists have
picked up this ball, but have not run with it, perhaps because of a found hunch that they might run
the wrong way. Oversaving may be nothing but a wrong name for under-investment. Indeed, in
1948 it appeared that inflation wsas fanned because people were not saving enough to finance
investment. See L. KLEIN, THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION 175 (1947); BORDEN 187; Rothschild,
A Note on Advertising, 52 EcON. J. 112 (1942).
Another diffident Keynesian argument is that advertising expenditures help overcome
depression because they are themselves investment in the sense that they create employment and
have a multiplier effect. See LEVER, ADVERTISING AND EcONOMIC THEORY, c. 7 (1947),
following Rothschild, A Note On Advertising, 52 ECON. J. 112 (1942). This may be true, as it
would be of paying people to dig holes and fill them up again, or of any other increment of
spending; but it adds nothing to the stock of capital. Besides, advertising outlays vary with the
cycle, not counter to it. BORDEN c. XXV.
59. Reynolds, The Canadian Baking Industry: A Study of An Imperfect Market 52 QJ. ECON.
659 (1938). Branded bread is a good example of spurious differentiation; the product is in fact
pretty much standardized. Ibid. Joyce, Today's Promotion of Branded Bread, 33 ADv. & SELLING
30 (Sept. 1940).
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"advertising seems to be the main factor" in supporting the overlarge
plants of the four biggest producers.' Such toleration of inefficiency and
excess capacity leads to high costs, whose pressure may push profits below
the competitive level. One element of such costs is the advertising expense
incurred in struggling to keep the market differentiated and inelastic, and
prices high. These drab developments, as we have seen, are far from
inevitable in any single firm or industry. But for the economy as a whole
the conclusion seems inescapable that the resources, measured in billions,
going into persuasive advertising, result only in a curtailed output of real
goods.6
[1180] It is only an affirmation of capitalist faith to insist that the search
for profit should guide the firm. And in America we have always been
prodigal with our resources. But when international tensions counsel a
policy of conservation, while the world at large clamors for cheap goods in
plenty, profits alone, when earned under the conditions described, seem
inadequate justification for persuasive advertising.
The Sovereign Consumer
Defenders of the institution have two additional lines of defense. The
first is that persuasive advertising creates a cluster of values, no less real
because they are intangible. The second, related to the first, argues that the
sovereign consumer has made a free election between those values and the
austerities of price competition.
These considerations bring us to the consumer as an individual. As an
individual, instead of a faceless component of mass purchasing power, he is
a creature of infinite diversity, with, moreover, a soul. To make a complete
analysis of what he gets from advertising, the relations of material rewards
and spiritual values, as affected by advertising, would have to be
60. Reynolds, Competition in the Rubber-Tire Industry, 28 AM. ECON. REV. 459 (1938).
61. These conclusions are now generally accepted in economics, I believe, and are
commonplace in the textbooks; see e.g., BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 620-1 (1941). The
significant arguments pro and con have been reviewed at length here because the conclusions
reached probably do not have general popular acceptance, especially among those whose training
antedates the development of the theory of monopolistic competition. A survey of text books of
twenty years ago indicates little or no concern with the problem, with the exception of SLICHTER,
MODERN ECONOMIC SOCIETY 663-7 (1931 ed.).
The economic consequences of persuasive advertising are sometimes lumped together with
the influence of fashion, improvements of quality or service, and other minor devices, as
manifestations of a more general phenomenon: non-price competition. See A. BuRNs, THE
DECLINE OF COMPETITION, c. VIII 1936); NELSON AND KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS
POLICY, c. HI (TNEC Monograph 1, 1940). This categorization, while meaningful in some
respects, obscures important distinctions. On the one hand, the role of style is somewhat
autonomous, and only partially controllable by sellers. On the other, improvements in quality, in
lieu of reductions in price, though they are often dictated by monopolistic price policy, at least
offer ponderable utilities. Their drawback is the failure to reach buyers who cannot afford the
higher price for the fancy model.
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considered. That task we must leave to the philosophers and the
psychologists. As was indicated earlier, they have not yet performed it.62
The only arena which is at all adequately staked out is that of the economic
conflict between seller and buyer. The agreed goal is the maximum
satisfaction of each consumer, as determined by his free choice in disposing
of his income.63 In a roundabout way, problems of aggregate output and
investment, already discussed, bear on the same goal. Now we have to
consider how persuasive advertising adds to or subtracts from the sum of
the individual's satisfied wants.
What are the intangible values? One is said to be the assurance of
[1181] reliability, because the advertiser wants to build up repeat sales, and
cannot afford to sell patently unsatisfactory goods. Admitting, for the sake
of getting on, that unadvertised brands offer a greater opportunity for "hit-
and-run" frauds, the difficulty with this contention is that the hope of
continued custom is quite unrelated to the magnitude of persuasive
advertising. Nothing more than information as to source is necessary for the
consumer to be able to repeat a satisfactory purchase.'
Other values derive from the proposition in that cheapness is not
enough.65 The buyer of an advertised good buys more than a parcel of food
or fabric; he buys the pause that refreshes, the hand that has never lost its
skill, the priceless ingredient that is the reputation of its maker. All these
may be illusions, but they cost money to create, and if the creators can
recoup their outlay, who is the poorer? Among the many illusions which
advertising can fashion are those of lavishness, refinement, security, and
romance. Suppose the monetary cost of compounding a perfume is trivial;
of what moment is this if the ads promise, and the buyer believes, that
romance, even seduction, will follow its use?66 The economist, whose dour
lexicon defines as irrational any market behavior not dictated by a logical
pecuniary calculus, may think it irrational to buy illusions; but there is a
62. See note 12 supra.
63. For extensive discussions of consumer choice, see KYRK, A THEORY OF CONSUMPTION
(1923); WYAND, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSUMPTION (1937). The use here of the concept is not
without awareness of its ambiguities. For example, many members of our society delegate their
power of choice, especially to housewives. Others are largely deprived of it, for example if they
are drafted. So effective choice is concentrated. The persons who exercise it most, besides agents
of the government, are the heads of families, who are not selected primarily for their competence
in buying. For this and numerous other reasons the diminution of persuasion would not lead to
completely rational satisfaction of wants, even if one includes in the term "rational" a degree of
rational irrationality, a paradox I trust will be intelligible in the light of the context. Perfect
rationality is no more attainable (and probably no more desirable) than perfect competition. But to
move toward it is better than to move away from it. If the defenders of unrestricted persuasive
advertising are content to rest their case on the ideal of consumer choice, a critic can too.
64. Seepostp. 1185.
65. See BORDEN 654-61; WYAND, ECONOMICS OF CONSUMPTION 141-4 (1937).
66. "It is an illusion, to be sure, but it is the substance of hope without which life would be
unbearable .. " Id. at 143, quoting a newspaper criticism of a work attacking the cosmetics
industry.
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degree of that kind of irrationality even in economic man; and consuming
man is full of it.
The taint of irrationality may be dispelled by asserting flatly that the
utility of a good, that is, its capacity to satisfy wants, is measured exactly by
what people will pay for it. If, as is undeniably the case, consumers will pay
more for an advertised brand than for its unheralded duplicate, then
consumers must get more satisfaction out of the advertised brand.67 The
nature of the satisfaction is of concern only to the moralist. Though this
argument can easily be pushed to absurdity-suppose it was to the interest
of the advertisers to consume half the national product in persuasion?-it
seems plausible if it is based on the dogma of consumer autonomy. Then
anyone who questions the untrammeled use of influence by the seller and
its uncoerced acceptance by the buyer is at best a Puritan,68 at worst a
Fascist. The debate [1182] seems to end in a defense of freedom, for the
advertiser as well as for the consumer.69
But does the sovereign consumer have real freedom of choice? The first
requisite of choice is an adequate presentation of alternatives. 0 The
classical economists who enthroned the consumer never dreamed that he
would make his decisions under a bombardment of stupefying symbols.71
He should be informed, and willing to pay the necessary price for
information. But the most charitable tabulations reveal relatively little
information in advertising directed to consumers outside the classified
columns and local announcements.72 National advertising is dominated by
appeals to sex, fear, emulation, and patriotism, regardless of the relevance
of those drives to the transaction at hand. The purchase of many advertised
articles, then, has a raw emotional origin.73 Many others are compelled by
the endless reiteration of the advertisers' imperative: eat lemons, drink
67. See Knight, Imperfect Competition, 3 J. OF MARKETING 360, 364 (1939); but see
Braithwaite, Economic Effects ofAdvertising, 38 ECON. J. 16,25 (1928).
68. See Riesman, Some Observations on Community Plans and Utopia, 57 YALE L.J. 173,
188 (1947) for a brief and pointed analysis of the puritanical motivation of many attacks on lavish
consumption.
69. The claim is often made that advertising promotes greater variety in goods than would
otherwise exist, and thus adds to consumer satisfaction. This is somewhat nullified by an
argument that advertising leads to greater standardization than would otherwise exist, thus adding
to productive efficiency. The facts probably depend on the extent to which advertising is
accompanied by the emergence of a few dominant producers. In an event, the point does not seem
worth much attention, because there is no reason to believe that the operation of consumer choice
through the price system would not evoke innovations at the rate desired by buyers.
70. On the necessity for consideration of alternatives as a basis for rational choice, see
LASSWELL, WORLD POLMCS AND INSECURITY, c. 1 (1935); MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN
AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION, pt. IV (1940).
71. See Stocking, Modem Advertising and Economic Theory, 21 AM. ECON. REv. 43 (1931),
criticized by Abramson, id. at 685.
72. Supra note 16.
73. ". . . trading on that range of human infirmities which blossom in devout observances and
bear fruit in psychopathic wards." VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 307 n. (1923).
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milk, wear hats. Pseudo-information fills any gaps. It takes many forms.
There is the bewildering manipulation of comparatives and superlatives:
"No other soap washes cleaner"; The world's most wanted pen." In the
atomic age, precise scientific data are helpful. Bayer's Aspirin tells us that
the tablet dissolves in two seconds. Whether the analgesic effect is then felt
in one hour or two hours will no doubt be explained in time. Buick lists
among its features such well-understood engineering terms as "Dynaflow
Drive, taper-thru Styling, Vibra-Shielded Ride, Hi-Poised Fire-ball Power."
The reader, after ten minutes with a magazine or the radio, can select his
own examples of the types of influence that are thought to move the
sovereign consumer.
The foundation of free choice, to repeat, is an adequate presentation of
alternatives. Admittedly, many choices, for example in politics or religion,
are presented under a smoke screen of exaggeration and emotion. But there
are usually at least two sides to the argument. The [1183] choice between
one highly advertised dentifrice and another is, in important respects, no
choice at all. It cannot register a decision to support or reject institutional
arrangements which, as had been shown, contribute to monopolistic waste
of resources; it cannot reflect a preference to get more or less for one's
money, to take an illusion or leave it. It is only a choice of between one
illusion and another. That advertisers, despite their intramural rivalry, are
aware that they stand on common ground, is shown by their united
opposition to institutions which enlarge the consumer's alternatives. An
instance is the forays and reprisals against the consumers' movement.74
The forces which counter advertising propaganda may be listed as
follows. First, as an individual protest, is the sentiment described as "sales
resistance," a compound of realism, skepticism, and apathy. Second is
organized sales resistance, the pressure for reform by the slow-moving
consumers' organizations. Third, most important economically, is the still
small voice of the lower price tag on an unadvertised substitute. Fourth, the
nub of the present discussion, comes the shaping of legal institutions, either
to curb the excesses of advertising or to foster the second and third forces
just listed. It is intended to discuss in a later article the enforcement of truth
in advertising, as an indication that freedom to persuade and influence has
its boundaries, and the possible use of antitrust, taxation, or other devices to
set new boundaries. The law also has to take a stand when the use or misuse
of advertising has created measurable values for the advertiser, and
"another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol." How
much protection will be given the advertiser against the poacher? The
answer is sought in the law of trade-marks and trade names.
74. SORENSON, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT, c. VII (1941).
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Summary
Before assessing the relevance of that body of doctrine to the good and
bad in advertising, it may be desirable to summarize the conclusions
reached thus far. Advertising has two main functions, to inform and to
persuade. With qualifications that need not be repeated, persuasive
advertising is, for the community as a whole, just a luxurious exercise in
talking ourselves into spending our incomes. For the individual firm,
however, it is a potent device to distinguish a product from its competitors,
and to create a partial immunity from the chills and fevers of competition.
The result of successful differentiation is higher prices than would
otherwise prevail. The aim, not always achieved, is higher profits. Whether
persuasive advertising enhances the total flow of goods by promoting cost
reductions is disputable. Whether it swells the flow of investment by the
lure of monopoly profits is doubtful.7'
[1184] For the consumer who desires to get the most for his money,
persuasive advertising displays a solid front of irrelevancy. The alternatives
to what the advertisers offer are not adequately presented, and the choice
among advertised products is loaded with a panoply of propaganda for
which the buyer pays, whether he wants it or not. However, both buyer and
seller profit from informative advertising. In a complex society, it is an
indispensable adjunct to a free traffic in goods and services. The task before
the courts in trade symbol cases, it may therefore be asserted, should be to
pick out from the tangle of claims, facts, and doctrines they are set to
unravel, the threads of informative advertising, and to ignore the
persuasive. The two functions are very much intertwined in trade symbols,
how confusingly will appear when we try to separate them.
II. THE LAW OF TRADE SYMBOLS REORIENTED
"We are nearly sure to go astray in any branch of the whole
subject, as soon as we lost sight of the underlying principle that the
wrong involved is diverting trade from the first user by misleading
75. At the beginning it was noted that advertising is one species of aggressive selling. If a
cataclysm abolished all admen, the same economic motives for differentiation would persist, and,
it might be contended, the same results would be sought through other means, notably direct
salesmanship. The enterpriser desiring to establish a brand preference would either have his
hirelings knocking on every door, or he would make the retailer his tool by persuading him to
increase his markup and concentrate his selling efforts on the higher-priced brand. Both methods,
of course, are in extensive use, and account for a considerable share of selling costs. However, the
fact that many tactics flourish together indicates as the marketing experts avow, that they are not
interchangeable. See BORDEN 81-7; VAUGHAN, MARKETING AND ADVERTISING 111-15 (1928).
Different devices sell different wares; and where several are useful they tend to be complementary
rather than alternative. In any event, the careful greenkeeper does not spare the dandelions
because crabgrass might grow in their place.
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customers who means to deal with him." L. Hand, J., in S.C.
Johnson & Son v. Johnson.
76
By trade symbols we mean the devices classified in law as trademarks,
trade names, or distinctive appearance of goods. In the marketer's
vocabulary, branding and packaging embrace like operations. For present
purposes, brand names, trade-marks, or trade names are functional
equivalents, and any technical differences may be ignored."' They refer to
words or phrases used in connection with goods and services to identify and
to distinguish them. Non-verbal symbols used for the same purposes, such
as colors, shapes, pictures, and designs, [1185] have no generally
understood label. The word "appearance" when used herein is to be
understood as referring to them.
Trade symbols are a species of advertising; their special characteristics
are brevity and continuity in use, both of which are essential to their
symbolic function. These characteristics make them easy to imitate, unlike
most advertising, which may be diffuse and changing. Consequently,
attempts to appropriate advertising values do not usually undertake to copy
extensive advertising,78 but only brand names or appearance. The occasions
when the law will prevent or punish any such appropriations presumably
have an important bearing on the value of advertising to the advertiser. But
the role of the law should not be appraised in terms of the advertiser's
interest alone. And from what has been said earlier, it is clear that a
distinction must be attempted between the informative and persuasive
functions of trade symbols.
The Informative Function
The informative job of trade symbols is conventionally considered to be
identification of source; and it is this capacity which courts traditionally
have protected.79 If, by using A's mark, B confuses buyers who mean to buy
from A and rely on the mark to denote A's goods, A is injured and can claim
protection against the diversion of trade caused by B's appropriation.
76. 116 F.2d 427,429 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
77. "There does exist a sharp distinction between trade-marks and trade names, although
wherein it lies it not quite clear," DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR
TRADING 228 (1936). For a concise summary of the difference, see 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §
716, comment a. Handler and Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and
Synthesis, 30 COL. L. REV. 168, 759 (1930), is definitive on the subject.
78. Copyright protection is available for advertising material; but it is apparently not much
used. See Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 KY. L.J. 205 (1947); Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 542,
547 (1932).
79. The summary of doctrine and its rationale which follows is orthodox, and will not be
documented in detail. For an authoritative, dispassionate statement, see 3 RESTATEMIENT, TORTS,
c. 35.
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Besides making A whole, the remedies given him are thought to help the
misled consumer, whose own action for deceit is practically useless. The
buyer should be able to assign praise or blame to the true source; 0 equally,
if it adds to his satisfaction to buy goods or specific origin, he should be
able to do so. These obvious interests correspond to those of the injured
seller, and thus, because of its informational value, the function of
identification is a clear case for protecting trade symbols against confusing
imitation.
A difficulty arose when, with the growing complexity of distribution, it
became apparent that many buyers who wanted goods with A's mark
neither knew nor cared for A's identity. A's continuing interest against
infringement of his mark was recognized in most cases, however, by
altering the formula to include a deception of buyers who expect the goods
to come from a single though unknown source, or to come [1186] from the
same source as earlier purchases bearing the same mark.!' Although any
reference to identification of origin is under these circumstances a
makeweight, the symbol is still informative, if what the buyer wants is to be
able to get the same thing he got before. Protection against imitation is in
this case also important to the producer. The imitator's goods may be the
same or even better than his; but they may also be inferior, and, under the
present scheme of marketing largely in reliance on brand names, the
disappointed expectations of buyers will presumably be vented against any
article bearing the symbol. Thus the first user loses present and perhaps
future sales.
Although few would leave a seller defenseless against such hazards,
legal theory has presented a minor stumbling-block in the persistence of
confusion of source as the only basis for relief. To eliminate the necessity
of touching this often fictitious base, writers have urged explicit recognition
for the function of trade symbols as designating a known article as well as a
known source. Unfortunately, they have overstated the case by christening
it the "guarantee" function of trade symbols.8 2 Since the user of the symbol
probably guarantees by it nothing more than his hope that the buyer will
come back for more, the term smacks strongly of the ad-man's desire to
create the illusion of a guarantee without in fact making more than the
80. The "source" or the "seller" does not have to be the manufacturer; it can be anyone in
the chain of distribution who attaches a symbol to the product; see Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-
Symbols, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1931).
81. See DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADiNG 35-39 (1936) for
examples.
82. Il at 38; Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 819, 824 (1927); cf 2 CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 808
(1945), hereafter cited as CALLMANN.
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minimum warranty of merchantable quality.83 This tendency is reflected in
advertising of the "Lucky Strike means fine tobacco" type. In trade name
law, Lucky Strike means a brand of cigarettes produced by the American
Tobacco Co., and it may mean cigarettes like those the smoker bought
yesterday, but it is not a grade designation or a certification mark.84 Talk
about the "guarantee" function of trade symbols is thus a somewhat
overblown attempt to escape from the strict doctrinal requirement of a
[1187] known source; it should not obscure the legitimate informational
value of labels pointing to an established reputation. 5
The Persuasive Function
The informative functions of trade symbols outlined above, though they
would be independently useful, rarely exist except as part of a larger
campaign of persuasion to divert demand toward a particular advertised
article. One of the problems of persuasion is the difficulty of concentrating
it on a single brand.86 A rhapsody to toothpaste is likely to benefit the entire
cause of overpriced dental hygiene unless it is focused on the advertised
product intensely enough to direct a purchase of that product rather than
any other dentifrice.8 7 Trade symbols are the distinguishing devices which
set one brand of toothpaste apart from the other ninety-and-nine. They not
only reach over the shoulders of the retailer;88 they reach from a radio
program on Sunday to a compulsive purchase on Friday. The function is
still, in a sense, one of identification. But now it is identification not with
83. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(4); VOLD, SALES 462 (1931). Doubtless most sellers wish to
have their symbols signify to buyers reliability, consistency, and other qualities. The point is that
the symbol carries no such legal assurance. The user can "trade up" or "trade down" within a
wide range of quality without risking any legal attack on his mark. Cf. Royal Baking Power Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 281 Fed. 744 (C.C.A. 2d 1922); Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1215 (1931).
84. "When a cigarette manufacturer advises the public in stident tones that the X brand of
cigarettes means fine tobacco, he finds many to imitate him. The air waves vibrate with the
message of trade-mark owners who aver that the A product means quality, that the B product
means a guaranteed life. . . or claims of similar import. Of course, they do not mean any of those
things. They mean products emanating from a particular source." Digges, Is Your Advertising
Destroying Your Trademark?, 35 T.M. REP. 51, 53 (1945).
85. "Reputation" is admittedly an ambiguous term. It is used here to mean attraction to
customers based on measurable differences over competitors in quality, variety, reliability, etc.
This sort of reputation differentiates the seller's product just as much as does advertising. But the
difference can be ended by like improvement on the part of competitors. Differentiation of this
type is quite distinguishable from the situation where more and more advertising is the means of
establishing or maintaining "reputation."
86. FREY, ADVERTISING 174 (1947); G. HOTCHISS, AN OUTLINE OF ADVERTISING 203
(1935 ed.).
87. It may overshoot the mark. It is reported that successful Ipana campaigns have led to a
considerable demand for pink tooth brushes. BURTr, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 67 (1938).
88. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818
(1927), ascribing this telling phrase to H.G. Wells.
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source, nor with prior purchases. It is identification with advertising. If the
advertising is successful, it directs demand to the article bearing the
symbol. The symbol itself then becomes a vital link. It is a narrow bridge
over which all the traffic powered by the advertising must pass. If an
imit4tor can seize the bridge, he can collect the right toll; and so it is
commonplace that the more highly advertised is a branded product, the
more attractive is its symbol to imitators.
With time, the symbol comes to be more than a conduit through which
the persuasive power of the advertising is transmitted, and acquires a
potency, a "commercial magnetism," of its own. One of the oldest of
advertising techniques, the simple reiteration of the brand name, contributes
to this result. Early advertising artists aspired to deface every natural
monument with such forgotten symbols as "Sapolio." Their successors, no
longer earthbound, write the bare syllables "Pepsi-Cola" in the sky. If
those who crane their necks at the sky-writing are unable to blurt any name
but Pepsi-Cola to the [1188] soda-clerk, the symbol obviously has
commercial value. Even though its continued nurture requires continued
outlays, the distillation of past displays and jingles and art exhibits into a
word makes that word of great price, quite independently of the vats and
alchemy that produce the drink. 9
Some symbols have a ready-made potency, and the right to use one
exclusively is also of value. Cautious restrictions by the courts on the
appropriation of such self-starting symbols have given rise to subtle
distinctions. Thus, words which connote desirable qualities in a product
(called suggestive marks) are given protection if they informatively denote
the source.9" Such words may show a certain ingenuity,9" like
"Seventeen," 92 "Glamour" and "Mademoiselle" for a trio of magazines
directed at young women, or they may fall into the category of what for
want of a better term may be called honorific marks. These include such
89. In American Safety Razor Corp. v. International Safety Razor Corp, 26 F.2d 108 (D.N.J.
1928), the plaintiff stated that it had paid approximately $8,000,000 over the value of physical
assets for the trade-marks "Gem," "Ever-Ready," and "Star" for razors and blades. Plaintiff,
seeking relief against a competing razor blade manufacturer who advertised in a supposedly
deceptive manner that his blades would fit plaintiff's razors, continued to advertise and sell all
three brands, at different prices though all the blades were identical. Neither this fact nor the
common source was disclosed to the public. Relief was denied on account of unclean hands.
Rev'd, 34 F.2d 445 (C.C.A. 3d 1929).
90. 2 CALLMiANN § 71.2.
91. Like slogans or catch-phrases, which may also be given trade name protection if they
come to signify source. In Lever Bros. v. Nobio Products, 103 F.2d 917 (C.C.P.A. 1939), the
mark "Nobio" for a deodorant was denied registration on the ground that Lever Bros. (with
$10,000,000 of advertising in ten years) had so associated "B.O." with their Lifebuoy soap that
"the term 'B.O.' serves to indicate origin in appellant." This is perhaps an extreme case.
92. Protected in Hanson v. Triangle Publications, 163 F.2d 74 (C.C.A. 8th 1947); triangle
Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (C.C.A. 2d 1948) (one judge dissenting in each case).
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hoary items as "Blue Ribbon," "Gold Medal," "Premier," and "Acme." 93
But if the symbol crosses a shadowy line and becomes descriptive rather
than suggestive, it may not ordinarily be monopolized. Common words
describing the product or its performance, like "Sta-Down" for girdles,94
should be free to all for information and explanation. However, if the, user
can show that a descriptive term has in fact come to signify his product and
his alone, he is then blessed with a valid trade name. The same exception95
limits the exclusive appropriation of elements of appearance, a
miscellaneous and vast congeries of visually attractive or memorable
devices such as striking pictures, [1189] easily identifiable designs, or
pleasant combinations of colors. These, when part of the article or its
container, are often seized upon because they are thought to be inherently
effective in drawing the buyer to the product. If, however, they also indicate
the course, they may be protected against confusing imitation.96
To recapitulate, we have now seen that trade symbols may serve as a
bridge between advertising and purchase, and that they may themselves be
the vehicle of persuasion, either because of extensive repetition and
embellishment apart from their use on goods, or because the advertiser has
selected and somehow appropriated to his exclusive use a symbol which
independently predisposes the customer to buy.97 These characteristics are
usually thoroughly intermingled; in any combination they add up to a
distinct category which should be called the persuasive advertising function
93. Marks of this sort are considered weak, and get only a narrow range of protection; see 2
CALLMANN § 82.1 (1); note 123 infra.
94. The H. & W. Co., 23 T.M. REP. 39 (Comm. Pat. 1932). This mark apparently derived
from the frequent fallacy that misspelling cures descriptiveness. See Pemberton, The Futility of
Misspelled Trade-Marks, 28 T.M. BULL. (n.s.) 42 (1933).
95. "Secondary meaning" is the unenlightening technical term; see 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 716, comment b.
96. But if the element of appearance in question contributes to the function of the article, the
imitator need not give it up, provided he takes reasonable steps to avoid deception. Id. at §§ 741-2.
97. Boulding suggests that the "principle of minimum differentiation," first propounded by
Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcON. J. 41 (1929), makes trade symbols valuable also as
the means of differentiation:
"The general rule for any new manufacturer coming into an industry is 'make your
products as like the existing products as you can without destroying the differences.' It
explains why all automobiles are so much alike, and why no manufacturer dares make a
car in which a tall hat can be worn comfortable. It even explains why Methodists,
Baptists, and even Quakers are so much alike, and tend to get even more alike, for if
one church is to attract the adherents of another, it must become more like the other but
not so much alike that no one can tell the difference. It explains the importance of
brand names in commercial, social, and even religious life, for the best way of making
a product as much like other products as possible without destroying the differences is
to make it physically similar to the others but to call it something different, and to try to
build up by advertising a preference in the mind of the buyer for the name of the
product. Thus it also explains the importance of advertising, for a great part of
advertising is little more than an attempt to establish a brand name in the minds of the
public."
BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 601 (1941).
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of trade symbols. Others have simply labeled it the advertising function,"
but we will call it the persuasive function, in contrast to the informative or
identification function. The latter comprehends the accepted legal doctrine
of identification of source, and the emerging doctrine of identification of
[1190] goods (misnamed the guarantee function), which serve generally the
same purposes as other informative advertising.99
From what has been said earlier about the economic waste and
distortion of consumer choice growing out of large-scale persuasive
advertising, it should be clear that the persuasive function of trade symbols
is of dubious social utility. There seems little reason why the courts should
recognize or protect interests deriving from it.
But a theoretical separation into black and white does not keep the real
world from remaining a confused gray. The same trade symbol usually
serves both functions-the informative and the persuasive. Can they be
disentangled?"° Is there any recognition in the cases of the persuasive value
of trade symbols? It seems to be conventional to recite the total advertising
expenditures of the parties."' These figures, however, raise no explicit
98. 2 CALLINN § 65.3. "Marks frequently have great advertising value though the articles
to which they refer have little or none, the mark being the principal, or perhaps, sole asset of the
business is supports." Id. at 813. Callmann has the great merit of avowing, almost alone among
trademark specialists, that the persuasive advertising function of trade symbols is significant.
Compare the position of Mr. E.S. Rogers, an acknowledged leader of the trade-mark bar, whose
long advocacy of extreme protection for trade symbols has been almost entirely in the name of
shielding the identification function against "dirty tricks." See Rogers, Book Review, 39 YALE
L.J. 297,301 (1929); Rogers, Freedom and Trade-Marks, 34 T.M. REP. 55 (1944).
99. Other functions may be briefly noted. Public clamor for a branded product frees the
manufacturer or distributor to some extent from dependence on the retailer, who otherwise can
promote whatever bmad is most profitable to him. This is an important strategic consideration
which does not affect the present argument. Also, the manufacturer, under the so-called Fair Trade
laws, can enforce resale price maintenance of a trade-marked article. The impetus to fix resale
prices, however, comes largely from independent retailers. See Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and
the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607, 615 (1940). A trade
symbol may also be "the focus of good public relations fostered to avoid taxation and public
regulation"; see Note, 41 ILL. L. REv. 679, 682 (1947).
100. "A trade-mark, in the contemplation of the law, means a particular article or articles
originating from a single source.
"In an advertising sense, a trade-mark represents the residuary value in good-will resulting
from the expenditure of the advertising dollar-a symbol of expectancy of continuing sales for the
product to which it is affixed....
"The advertising conception of a trade-mark and the law's conception of a trade-mark, at
first blush, might appear to be in complete harmony with each other. Nothing could be further
from the truth. In practical application they may be continuously at war." Digges, Is Your
Advertising Destroying Your Trade-Mark?, 35 T.M. REP. 51 (1945).
101. The amounts are usually expressed in a lump sum covering outlays over many years. In
the price discrimination case against Goodyear for selling tires to Sears Roebuck, bearing Sears'
brand, at a lower price than the identical tries were sold to dealers under the Goodyear brand,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 101 F.2d 620 (C.C.A. 6th 1939),
Goodyear argued before the Commission in defense of such cumulated figures: "We believe that
the... total amount expended in respect of advertising for the full history of the company
[$72,000,000] is relevant as giving some measure of that value which is given to Goodyear
dealers in the sale of Goodyear tires and not to Sears Roebuck in the sale of tires to Sears
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issues. °2 To see whether the courts [1191] are sympathetic to values created
by persuasive advertising, we should look for a situation in which the
functions are not intermingled, and in which protection is demanded for
persuasive values alone.
Dilution
The clearest, most candid, and most far-reaching claim on behalf of
persuasive values is summed up in the word dilution. The dilution theory" 3
is based on the fact that the more widely a symbol is used, the less effective
it will be for any one user. The color red, for example, may be more striking
on a package than other colors, but if half the boxes on the super-market
shelf are red, its power is thereby dissipated." 4 The words "Gold Medal"
may once have had considerable power, but each time a new commodity
comes along and christens itself Gold Medal, all the other Gold Medals lost
part of their magic.' Thus, the profit potential of a symbol may be diluted
by several types of conduct that would not jeopardize its informative value
and give rise to an actionable wrong for confusing buyers as to source. If an
advertiser has a persuasive symbol, he had stored up in a number of
Roebuck." Quoted in HAMILTON AND ASSOCIATES, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES 103 n. (1938).
Sears, it was further argued, got "an aggregation of rubber and fabric and nothing more"; the
dealers (at the higher price) got "a tangible and an intangible. The tangible is the material content
of the tires. The intangible is the right to sell the tire under the Goodyear trademark." Quoted in
Borchardt, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem? 31 GEo. L.J 245,258 (1943).
102. Except where an attempt is being made to establish secondary meaning, see note 95,
supra, in an otherwise non-exclusive symbol. There, expenditures on advertising are pertinent to
show the plaintiff's effort to associate the symbol and the source in the public mind. See cases
collected 150 A.L.R. 1090 (1944). But "large expenditures for advertising do not compel a
conclusion that the task has been accomplished." General Time Instruments Corp. v. United
States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 855 (C.C.A. 2d 1948). But cf. Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896,
897 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897) ("The money invested in advertising is as much a part of the business as
if invested in buildings, or machinery, and a rival in business has no more right to use the one than
the other."); Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356 (C.C.A. 9th 1948).
103. So named in a German case, involving identical marks on mouthwash and hardware;
introduced into American discussion by Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831 (1927); see Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37
COL. L. REV. 582,588,601 (1937).
104. For recent cases in which exclusive use of the color red had been sought against a
competitor, see: Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F.2d
662 (C.C.A. 1st 1946) (red circle on rubber footwear, narrowly protected); James Heddon's Sons
v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 6th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1942)
(red line around fish lure box, not protected); G.H. Mumm Champagne v. Eastern Wine Corp.,
142 F.2d 499 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944) (diagonal red band on
champagne label, protected); Radio Corp. of America v. Decca Records, 51 F. Supp. 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (red center of phonograph records, not protected).
105. Cf. France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304 (C.C.A. 2d 1925), cert.
denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925). France used "Gold Medal" on prepared pancake flours Washburn-
Crosby on wheat flour. Held: each would be protected only in the precise field occupied, because
of the non-distinctive character of the mark, which had been registered more than 60 times. Gold
Medal, a heavily advertised wheat flour, is nevertheless able to maintain a substantial price
differential over other brands of this rather uniform product; see BORDEN 585.
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persons' brain cells some degree of desire to buy goods bearing the symbol.
No galvanometer has been devised to measure that potential, or the extent
of its dissipation by the use of the symbol of another's [1192] goods, but if
the different uses impinge on the same buyers, the effect is much feared.
What the proponents of the dilution theory argue is that it should be given
equal protection with the interest against confusion. The theory's most
vigorous living champion is Callmann, who in his Unfair Competition and
Trade Marks argues forcefully for the proposition that courts are in effect
doing this, though in a roundabout way."0 6
The conspicuous case in which protection against dilution is said to be
granted, in fact though not in theory, is in the use of like symbols on unlike
goods.'0 7 If our assumption of the potency of a persuasive symbol is correct,
it is easy to see why a seller of suspenders might hope to garner some
unearned increment by christening them "Lucky Strike." It is equally easy
to see that freedom to use a highly differentiated mark on any goods but the
original user's product would dilute the mark quite disastrously. But for a
long time, the courts found distressingly logical grounds for refusing relief.
How could there be unfair competition when there was no competition?
How could the defendant's goods be passed off for those of the plaintiff, if
the plaintiff did not make the type of article in question?'
But the life of the law is not logic, and in the roaring twenties a new
rationale was developed. Assuming that a defendant who would jeopardize
the plaintiff's advertising budget was in all probability a shady character,
the courts decided that, if the article bearing the copies symbol was one
which might reasonable be expected to come from the plaintiff, the
defendant's use of the symbol unfairly jeopardized the plaintiff's
reputation.0 9 In a famous passage, Judge Learned Hand wrote,
"... . it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may
have a sufficient economic interest in the use of this mark outside
the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court.
106. 2 CALLMANN § 84.2. In a recent article Dr. Callmann develops the thesis that the
interest of a trade symbol user against dilution is not part of the law of unfair competition, since
neither competition nor confusion is involved; it is a property interest. Callmann, Unfair
Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the Property Concept in the Law of Trade-
Marks, 95 U. OF PA. L. REV. 443 (1947).
107. 2 CALLMANN § 84.2(a). The many cases are collected in 148 A.L.R. 12 (1944).
108. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (C.C.A. 7th
1912); see Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37 COL. L. REV. 582, 590 (1937).
This view may persist in some states; see cases collected 148 A.L.R. 12, 19 (1944).
109. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C.C.A. 2d 1917), cert. denied,
245 U.S. 672 (1918) (pancake flour and syrup); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed.
509 (C.C.A. 6th 1924), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926) (woman's magazine and hats); Wall v.
Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333 (C.C.A. 3d 1925) (automobiles and radio tubes); Lukens,
Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 197 (1927).
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His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the [1193]
goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another
uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer
lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the
borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator,
and another can use it only as a mask." 110
An additional basis for relief, characteristic of the era, was found in the
plaintiff's "natural" tendency to expand."' His growth, if it took in the
defendant's field, might be stunted by the unavailability of his symbol. This
ground was certainly no broader than the interest in reputation, and has
been severely limited in late years.'
Either argument required that the two products, though dissimilar, be
"related" ;1 3 for if they occupied totally different spheres of the economy,
the reputation of the borrower could not affect that of the originator of the
symbol, nor could the latter be expected to expand into the imitator's totally
different market. Though the necessary degree of relation has been found,
to cite only recent examples, between a radio station and a printing
company, 4 between corsets and cosmetics,"' and between shoes and
watches, 6 the recent trend in appellate courts has been to restrict the
doctrine."7 In 1934, Judge Learned Hand suggested the gulf between
steam-shovels and lipsticks [1194] as the degree of remoteness necessary to
110. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972,974 (C.C.A. 2d 1928).
111. Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C.C.A. 6th 1917); William Waltke
& Co. v. Geo. H. Schafer & Co., 263 Fed. 650 (App. D.C. 1920); Wilcox & White Co. v. Leiser,
276 Fed. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). Compare the cognate interest in geographical expansion, Sweet
Sixteen co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); cases collected 148 A.L.R.
12, 117 (1944).
112. S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); Dwinell-Wright Co. v.
White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
113. See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 730, comment b: "The interest [in a trade-mark or trade
name] is not protected against the use of a similar designation for any goods, services or business.
It is protected only within the limits fixed by the likelihood of confusion of prospective
purchasers. The issue in each case is whether the goods, service or businesses... are sufficiently
related so that the alleged infringement would subject the goodwill and reputation of the other's
trade-mark or trade name to the hazards of the actor's business." This passage is quoted as a
reminder that the test for "relation" is the likelihood of confusion. Probable confusion is the
starting-point in the great majority of the cases, whether they concern non-competing or
competing goods. In the discussion above the nature of the interest protected against confusion is
emphasized; the content of "probable confusion" is the subject of the next section.
114. Bamberger Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. Orloff, 44 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
115. Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 MI1. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165
(1943) (alternative ground to confusion that "the good-will of plaintiff, which it had built up at
great expense over a period of years, would be whittled away").
116. Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947) (dilution and injury to
reputation both stated as grounds for relief.
117. Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust Trade-
Mark and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L.J. 514,538-41 (1944).
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bar relief;" 8 in 1943 he was more than doubtful about protecting toy banks
selling for fifty-nine cents and up against other banks retailing for ten
cents. 9
As a matter of fact, no plausible interpretation of the reputation
rationale would adequately serve the interest against dilution. The damage
is done by the mere use of the symbol by another, regardless of whether the
advertiser's reputation is likely to be tarnished; he may not even have a
reputation, except in the sense of the revealing maxim, "Repetition is
reputation." Callmann scoffs at the reasoning of the cases as they stand,
because the finding of a probable connection in the public mind between
the businesses in question is occasionally unrealistic; such cases represent,
he thinks, a refusal to face the dilution issue squarely.12 One may readily
concede the point; but if the dilution theory is approached by the courts
with conceptions about the social utility of persuasive advertising at all like
those expressed here, no great difference should be expected in the outcome
of future cases.' Once the dilution argument is flatly rejected, a critical
examination of the present theory of protecting plaintiff's reputation may
produce clearer results. Judge Frank has already pointed out that the
defendant ought to have an opportunity to prove that he will not harm the
plaintiff's fair name."' Good repute may be beyond price; but it is notbeyond cross-examination."z [1195]
118. See L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272,273 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
119. Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (C.C.A. 2d 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943) (weakness of mark and indifference of buyers to source also grounds
for refusing relief).
120. 2 CALLMANN 1337.
121. Except in Massachusetts, where a recent statute declares that:
"Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-
mark infringement or unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services."
ANN. LAws MASS., C. 110, § 7A (Supp. 1947) (emphasis supplied).
This statute may have been intended to alter the supposed Massachusetts rule denying relief
in non-competing goods cases. Hub Dress Mfg. Co. v. Rottenberg, 237 Mass. 281, 129 N.E. 442
(1921); see National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 509 (D. Mass.
1942). But it clearly goes much further.
122. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 42 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) (concurring
opinion).
123. An interesting cross-current in the non-competing goods cases is the weight given the
distinctiveness of the symbol. Commonplace or honorific marks, being widely used, cannot claim
wide protection from use on non-competing goods. If a man calls his beer "Arrow," he cannot
complain if another calls his liqueurs "Arrow" too, when the mark has been registered in the
Patent Office ninety-eight times. Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (C.C.A.
4th 1941). But the Eastman Kodak Co. an probably prevent anyone from calling almost anything
Kodak. Without attempting to analyze the reasons, which may only reflect the likelihood of strong
association between a distinctive mark and the source, we can admit that deference to fanciful
marks carries along in its wake protection of any persuasive advertising value the symbol may
have. Therefore a great deal of persuasive value can be built up in a distinctive mark,
accompanied by a broad area of protection.
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Confusion
Though the dilution theory, as such, has made little headway in the case
of non-competing goods,124 there remains the equally important possibility
of dilution among competing goods by the use of imitative symbols which
drain off the advertiser's selling potential without falling afoul of
conventional canons of confusion of source. For example, the
manufacturers of Camel cigarettes might be quite exercised if a Dromedary
brand appeared on the market, but they would be hard put to prove that
buyers were confused. And likely confusion of customers, as we have seen,
is the universal judicial touchstone in trade name cases. But once the
likelihood of confusion has been established, further inquiry into the
significance of the mark to the buying public is rare.12s Consequently, a
decree for plaintiff based on confusing similarity protects alike the symbol
as information and the same symbol as vehicle for persuasion. This is
unavoidable, even though, as may often be the case with a highly advertised
symbol, its identification function is negligible, compared with the
dominant association between symbol and persuasive advertising.
126
Therefore, a promising line of indirect attack for the proponents of the
dilution theory is to exploit the considerable confusion about confusion. A
brief and satisfactory statement of the rule is as follows: [1196] "Plaintiff
need show only that the name adopted by defendants is so similar to its
trade-mark as to be likely to cause confusion among reasonably careful
purchasers." 27 But its application, like that of many rules, is hedged with
qualifications and admonitions. Since more trade name proceedings are in
124. There are probably not more than a dozen cases in which it has been explicitly
mentioned; and where it was made a basis for decision, "no cases have been found in which there
was not present an element of confusion." Annotation, 148 A.L.R. 12, 77 (1944); cases collected
id. at 74-7). Recent cases discussing dilution include Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp.
543 (D. Mass. 1947) (dilution alternative ground for relief; note 107 supra); Pro-phy-lac-tic Brush
Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549 (C.C.A. 1st 1948) (dilution theory inapplicable to
competing goods; note 155 infra); Stock Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356 (C.C.A. 9th
1948) (dilution theory, described as a "corollary' to -confusion of source, applied in case of
restaurants in different cities). The run of cases continues to emphasize likely confusion of source
leading to possible injury to plaintiff's reputation. But cf the Mass. statute, note 121 supra.
125. See note 136 infra.
126. See 2 CALLMANN 813: "The function of indicating origin, however, is indispensable
and is a necessary aid to the advertising function.... The function of indicating origina is merely
auxiliary to the advertising function and has no independent significance." It was doubtless this
fact that led Professor Chamberlin to urge that the public interest would be best served by
permitting unlimited confusion through imitation, so that it would be almost impossible to
accomplish advertising differentiation. He would thus scrap the identification function, leaving the
public to be protected against debased imitations by standard grades, etc. CHAMBERLIN, THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 246-50, App. E, "Some Arguments in Favor of Trade-Mark
Infringement and 'Unfair Trading"' (5th ed. 1946). For the moment we may reject this forthright
suggestion on the ground that the alternatives he proposes are not in existence or in prospect.
127. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 117 (C.C.A. 2d 1946),
cert. dedied, 329 U.S. 771 (1946). Emphasis supplied.
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equity, judges have to make the decision whether the likelihood of
deception exists. If identical symbols are used on identical goods, the
decision is easy.' If the defendant's intention to copy the plaintiff's
symbol is proved, the court can wryly assume that his effort was successful,
and again the decision is easy.'29 Most cases, however, are not so easy. The
judge has to try to put himself in the position of the customer, and to decide
whether he, as a customer, would be likely to be deceived. But what is the
position of the customer in a world ruled by advertising? From the time he
picks up his morning paper until he switches off his radio at bedtime he is
bombarded with literally thousands of trade symbols. He goes to work in a
public conveyance papered with them. His way is lined with billboards and
shop windows proclaiming them. He checks the date from an advertiser's
calendar, winnows a harvest of leaflets from his mail, closes the window
against a sound truck and perhaps escapes for a few hours. Then on his
return home he exposes himself to a stupefying flow of persuasion from the
radio. When he ventures into a store to perform the act of buying, myriads
of symbols, attached to exhortations, pleas, reminders, and threats, stir
uneasily in his subconscious, while hundreds more dance before his eyes
from packages, posters, and animated displays. Is he confused?
Undoubtedly. The judge comparing in isolation, now "Chateau Martin"
with "Chateau Montay" wine,"3 now "LaTouraine" with "Lorraine"
coffee,' 31 cannot reproduce the murky totality of a trip to the market.1 32 No
more can the psychologist with his laboratory tests for confusion.
33
We have, then, as the chief actor in trade symbol dramas a synthetic
figure, the deceived buyer. Since he is but a figment, those interested
[1197] in advertising values can perhaps reshape him to suit the commercial
drive for freedom from dilution. The portrait of the imaginary consumer
given above suggests that he is indeed confused, but by the very
multiplicity of symbols."3 To this extent the drive to differentiate is self-
128. See 2 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETrTON AND TRADE-MARKS § 225 (4th ed. 1947).
129. Id. at § 355a. Defendant may rebut the prima facie case if he can. My-T-Fine Corp. v.
Samuels, 69 F.2d 76,77 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
130. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (C.C.A. 2d 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) (held, confusion unlikely).
131. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 771 (1946) (confusion likely; one judge dissenting).
132. "We can only contemplate, speculate and weigh the probabilities of deception arising
from the similarities and conclude as our, and the District Judge's, reactions persuade us."
Colbum v. Puritan Mills, Inc., 108 F.2d 377,378 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
133. See Jenkins, Additional Variables in Trade-Name Confusion, 35 PSYCH. BULL. 649
(1938).
134. The number of desires which the buyer can connect with a known symbol and retain to
the point of purchase is miserably finite; but of the making of symbols there is no end. Nims
estimates 280,000-300,000 unexpired trade-mark registrations in the Patent Office. I NIMS,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS v (4th ed. 1947). These constitute only a fraction of
the total number of brands of goods. In a single urban market, Milwaukee, there were 148 brands
of packaged coffee, 29 brands of cigarettes, 87 of pipe tobacco, 99 of toothpaste, 100 of shaving
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defeating. The attempt to bend the rubric of confusion to the uses of
dilution can, however, exploit the babel of brands. First, it is implicitly
assumed that the buyer always aspires to follow the lead of the advertiser,
and to have his hand guided in the supermarket. One may pause to doubt
the universality of the assumption. There must be many instances where
complete indifference reigns.13 The buyer cannot be deceptively confused
if he does not care whether he gets Thinsies or Thins. No doubt the
difficulty of establishing the degree of reliance on brands accounts for the
fact that the courts do not often stop to consider this factor, though there is
persuasive authority for doing so." 6
Returning to the attempt to expand the concept of confusion, the next
step, after hypothesizing that the consumer cares, is to emphasize, [1198]
rather than minimize, the perils of choice in a world full of dishonest
tradesmen bent on substituting something just as good. Finally, the courts
are urged to an extreme solicitude for the buyer's frailties.137 This requires
shifting the emphasis from the "reasonably careful purchaser" to insistence
that
"The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the
public-that vast multitude, which includes the ignorant, the
unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not
cream, etc. BORDEN 633-6. In each field, however, there was likely to be considerable
concentration among a few leading brands. See BORDEN 637-9.
135. Cf. Aldous Huxley, commenting on the difficulties of successful ethical or political
propaganda compared to the ease of advertising: "A great deal of advertising is concerned with
matters of no importance whatsoever. Thus I need soap; but it makes not the smallest difference to
me whether I buy soap manufactured by X or soap manufactured by Y. This being so, I can allow
myself to be influenced in my choice by such entirely irrelevant considerations as the sex appeal
of the girl who smiles so alluringly from X's posters, or the puns on I's and his comic drawings.
In many cases of course I do not need the commodity at all.... In these cases commercial
propaganda is an invitation to give in to a natural or acquired craving. In no circumstances does it
ever call upon the reader to resist temptation; always it begs him to succumb. It is not very
difficult to persuade people to do what they are all longing to do." Huxley, Notes on Propaganda,
174 HARPER'S 32 (1937).
136. Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (C.C.A. 2d 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943) (indifference of buyers to source of trifling object one ground for
denying relief). 2 CALLMANN 1123 asserts that it is of no importance whether the public cares
about the source. This position is of course consistent with his view that the plaintiff should be
protected in trying to build up persuasive values. Compare the requirement for protection against
deceptive imitation of appearance of goods, an instance of secondary meaning: "... . it is an
absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff in such cases show that the appearance
of his wares has in fact come to mean that some particular person-the plaintiff may not be
individually known-makes them, and that the public cares who does make them.... ." Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299, 300 (C.C.A. 2d 1917); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs
Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
137. The attitude summarized here is well illustrated by the discussions of confusing
similarity in the leading treatises; see 2 CALLMANN 1127-46; 2 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETION AND
TRADE-MARKS 1024-38 (4th ed. 1947), both emphasizing "the ordinary purchaser" as the
standard. Cf. Note, 'Confusion' in Trade Name Infringement, 41 ILL. L. REV. 679 (1947).
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stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general
impressions." 138
In trade symbol cases, the unwary purchaser is scarcely a worthy object
for judicial solicitude. He is a convenient front for advertisers who hope to
keep a clear channel for their persuasive messages, free from the signals of
later comers. The difficulty of preventing such interference is no reason for
relaxing the standards of the "reasonable careful purchaser." Reasonable
care in this field implies a buyer who at most needs to be able to read large
print, 39 distinguish primary colors, and say what he wants. The figure of
the unwary, casual, incautious unsuspecting purchaser 40  suggests
conclusions which those who favor him could scarcely confess: that people
are not very bright, and that a good deal of persuasion cancels out, leaving
consumers (bright or not) indifferent as to either origin or advertising of
many goods. Communication free of confusion need to be fostered only for
sellers who give and buyers who seek information. [1199]
Goodwill and Misappropriation
We have now dealt with two major currents of trade name doctrine
which concern persuasive values: first, the dilution theory, especially as
applied to non-competing goods; second, the tests for confusion of source
of competing goods. In both areas it may be said that avowed protection of
persuasive values is infrequently given. Also brought to bear on the tangle
of persuasive and informative functions are the concepts of goodwill as
property, and the abortive interest against misappropriation of intangible
values.
Goodwill is a term of quite ambiguous reference, with many definitions
that have improve little on Lord Eldon's terse dictum, ".... the probability
that the old customers will resort to the old place." 14' Its pertinence here is
138. Coxe, J., in Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co. 178 Fed. 73,75 (C.C.A. 2d 1910), a
statement so admired by Nims, op. cit. supra note 137, that it appears on his titlepage. I do not
intend to suggest that the qualifications of the buyer-whether he is an expert or an aborigine-
are irrelevant. All that is urged is that the depressing of the judicial standard from "reasonable" to
"ordinary" to "ignorant" is unwise. See California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking
Co., 166 F.2d 971 (C.C.A. 7th 1947), in which Minton, J., said, "We cannot believe that anyone
whose I.Q. is high enough to be regarded by the law would ever be confused or would be likely to
be confused in the purchase of a loaf of bread branded as 'Sunkist' because someone else sold
fruits and vegetables under that name." Id. at 973.
139. In Hi-Land Dairyman's Association v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P.2d 710
(1944), the defendant adopted the general color scheme and appearance of plaintiff's milk
container, the brand names etc. were quite distinguishable. The court held plaintiff entitled to an
injunction, because of confusion of "ordinary purchasers," citing a witness who testified, "I don't
go to a grocery store to read". Id. at 76, 151 P.2d at 714.
140. For catalogues of adjectives characterizing purchasers, see references cited note 137
supra.
141. Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346 (1810).
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the frequent identification of trade symbol values with goodwill, and of
goodwill with property.112 To refine this crude syllogism we must also try to
refine Lord Eldon. Perhaps it may be agreed for present purposes that
goodwill represents a capitalized appraisal of profit potentialities not
allocable to tangible assets. The persuasive magnetism of a trade symbol is
obviously such an intangible, often of great commercial value. But the
recognition in business circles of that value is only partially a prediction
whether the courts will protect it against various forms of encroachment.143
At the differential profit advantage of a firm, goodwill may arise from
superior efficiency, from convenience, from confidence, from nepotistic
connections, from persuasive advertising, from successful infringement of a
persuasive symbol, from threats of violence, and so on into a range of
conduct entirely beyond the pale of the law." 4 Furthermore, the existence of
goodwill may be at issue in a!-variety of contexts-bankruptcy, stock
valuation, taxation. 45 The interests against confusion of source and harm to
reputation are generally protected; they may therefore [1200] be called
goodwill and property if it is convenient to do so. The fact that a probate
court might label the persuasive advertising function of a trade symbol
goodwill is irrelevant to its claim to protection in the law of unfair
competition. Legal goodwill is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, not a
tool for reaching a conclusion.
The demand for judicial protection against misappropriation of values
created by the skill or effort of a competitor stems from a theory of
competition which cannot be examined here in detail.'46 The ethical basis of
the theory is flavored with scripture: "he who reaps where he has not
sown" is said to be unjustly enriched. 4 7 Ripened by the news piracy case of
International News Service v. The Associated Press14 the misappropriation
142. Cf. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194
(1936); but cf Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1935). A
collection of authorities referring to trade symbols as variously creating, reflecting, or embodying
goodwill may be found in 1 NiMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 73-85 (4th ed.
1947). For a trenchant attack on the view that trade symbols must be protected because they are
property, see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REV.
809, 814 (1935); but cf. Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 443 (1947).
143. "Undoubtedly, the exclusive right to use a certain collocation of words or signs to
designate a certain class of goods may have a considerable money value as an advertisement, but
the fact that a right would have a money value, if it existed, is not a conclusive reason for
recognizing the right. * * * When the common-law developed the doctrine of trade-marks and
trade names, it was not creating a property in advertisements more absolute than it would have
allowed the author of Paradise Lost .. " Holmes, J., in Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 193,
23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1890).
144. Cf. Wright, The Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill, 24 IL. L. REv. 20 (1929).
145. Id. at 22.
146. See 1 CALLMANN, cc. 1, 2, 15 (1945).
147. See Callman, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of
Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV.595 (1942).
148. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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doctrine then withered on the vine, and is now confined pretty narrowly to
cases related to news reporting.'49 Its gross fallacy is the assumption of a
general policy in favor of monopolies in ideas, systems, or any ingenious
contrivance. Actually the limited monopolies of trade-mark, patent and
copyright stand as narrow exceptions to the "general rule of law" that "the
noblest of human productions-knowledge, truth ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air
to common use."150
Echoes of misappropriation theory are heard in trade name cases as a
counterpoint to complaints against dilution; the plaintiff has created the
market, defendant should not be allowed to share in it. Specifically, it is
used to bolster claims to exclusive use of the class of marks described
earlier as inherently potent. The plaintiff has the wit to call his chocolate
"Ambrosia"; should a vendor of "Ambrosia" cakes be allowed to tempt
buyers nurtured on the classics and hungry for the food of the gods? The
Fourth Circuit says he can: "Ambrosia" was not an invention to be
rewarded with a patent monopoly; " a man of ordinary intelligence could
easily devise a score of valid trade-marks in a short period of time." 5' The
promoter of Pocket Books desires to be rid of one of the imitators who
copies the getup of the convenient volumes. Will the courts reserve to him
the appearance of the books, and badge of his ingenuity? No, the New York
Court of Appeals held. [1201] Buyers of books are presumable literate, and
any one who cares can identify the source.'52 But two judges thought the
defendant was misappropriating the plaintiffs format and should be
enjoined. The minority view is persistent.'53 It lets admiration for
innovation obscure the soundness of rules designed to foster free and easy
competition. And it overlooks the complications that would result if the
judges embarked on a quixotic venture in giving prizes to advertisers. The
majority"' is right in sticking to the proposition that the only interest in
149. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575 (C.C.A. 9th 1935), rev'd for want of
jurisdiction, 299 U.S. 269 (1936). See Comment, Unfair Competition and Exclusive Broadcasts of
Sporting Events, 48 YALE L.J. 288 (1938); Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289,
1314 (1940).
150. Brandeis, J., dissenting in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
250 (1918).
151. Ambrosia Chocolate Co. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, Inc., 165 F.2d 693 (C.C.A. 4th 1947)
cert. denied, 68 S. Ct. 914 (1948) (laches and absence of confusion also found).
152. Pocket Books, Inc. v. Meyers, 292 N.Y. 58,54 N.E. 2d 6 (1944).
153. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna auto finance, 123 F.2d 582 (C.C.A. 5th
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942) (misappropriation language in trade name confusion
case); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), rev'd, 114. F.2d 86 (1940)
(musical performance, not copyright); Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, 168
Misc. 814, 6 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1031, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 976 (4th
Dep't. 1939), rev'd, 283 N.Y. 1, 27 N.E.2d 212 (1940) (business system, not patented).
154. See Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition, 53 YALE L.J. 514, 546-9 (1944).
16531999]
1654 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1619
trade symbols worth protecting are those against loss of sales or loss of
reputation.
The Technique of Defense
It should not be technically difficult to defend the view that persuasive
values, as such, are not entitled to protection in trade name cases. The
defendant can simply answer that the plaintiff who seeks relief against
dilution or misappropriation does not state a cause of action. The federal
Trade-Mark Act makes its remedies available only where the defendant's
use of the mark "is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of... goods or services." 155 If the plaintiff
moves on to the broader ground of unfair competition, and, taking his cue
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declares that the defendant "poaches upon the
commercial magnetism of the symbol," [1202] the plea is the same. The
heavy artillery of precedent is on the side of the defendant.156 Only if a
counterattack is planned to deny the plaintiff any relief, even against
confusion, does it become necessary to consider the interesting possibility
of borrowing from the patent cases the defense that the plaintiff's conduct
violates the anti-trust laws.'57 As yet there is no substantial precedent to
155. 60 STAT. 427, 437, § 32 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051, § 1114(1)(a) (Supp. 1947). But cf.
the Massachusetts statue, note 121 supra, and quaere if by some osmosis it affected the curious
opinion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co.,
165 F.2d 549 (1948)? The holder of the registered mark "jewelite" for hairbrushes sued to enjoin
the use of the mark "Gem Lite," also on brushes. No likely confusion was found. The plaintiff
then argued that the "memory value" and good will of its mark should be protected from dilution.
Deciding the case under the 1905 Trade-Mark Act, which permitted relief only where the mark
was used on "merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties." 33 STAT. 728
(1905), 15 U.S.C. § 96 (1940), the court held that the dilution doctrine "has no application" to a
case within the statute, and since the goods in question were of the same descriptive properties,
"no bearing upon the situation with which we are here concerned." 165 F.2d at 533. This holding
seems to be correct, and equally applicable to any case brought under the 1946 Act. The court,
however, went on to explain that "the dilution doctrine operates to give the owner of a registered
trade-mark the same protection against the use of his mark by others on goods of different
descriptive properties.... But the marks must be deemed similar before the doctrine has any
application." In a final flourish of dicta the court said that "the word 'jewel', being weak, was
already diluted". ]bid
156. Part II of this paper passim. Deserving of special mention contra is Stork Restaurant Inc.
v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (C.C.A. 9th 1948), in which the court, at the prayer of the well-known
night club, enjoined a small San Francisco tavern from using its name and insigne. Among the
grounds for decision were: plaintiffs advertising outlay, threat of dilution, confusion of ignorant
patrons, protection of goodwill, and misappropriation. On each of these matters the court took a
position contrary to that advanced herein. As an antidote to this remarkable brew, cf California
Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (C.C.A. 7th 1947), notes 4 and 138
supra.
157. Cf. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The doctrine of the Morton
Salt case and its successors evolves from the equitable doctrine requiring clean hands. See Note,
51 YALE L.J. 1012 (1942). Clean hands, as hitherto applied in trade name cases, has referred
chiefly to fraudulent misrepresentations by the plaintiff, either in the symbol or advertising. See 2
CALLMANN 1422. For a whimsical suggestion that the "almost fantastic chasm" between the cost
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indicate the degree of control of an industry through trade symbols which
would be held a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize any part of
trade or commerce. 5 ' That the trade-mark monopoly, like the patent
monopoly, is confined by the policy of the anti-trust laws seems
unquestionable. 159 Perhaps an over-bold plaintiff, asking the courts to police
a scheme of industrial dominion, will invite retaliation and case some light
on these matters.
The Wretched Defendant
It may now be objected with complete propriety that the discussion has
been one-sided. It has been exclusively concerned with the plaintiff's
supposed desire to escape from the heat of competition, an arena [1203] in
which we are determined to keep him pent for the common good. But if
plaintiff loses, defendant wins. We have previously referred to defendant
impartially as a copier or an imitator. Is he not also likely to be a cheat, a
chiseler, and, worst of all, a newcomer? No doubt all these epithets are
often merited. We have been dealing with a segment of the law of unfair
competition, which, lending legal support to the enlightened ethical
standards of the business community, has concentrated on curbing the
chicanery of traders. Unfair competition's emphasis on unfairness has
perhaps led to some neglect of competition.160 The disproportion of this
paper has been deliberate, since it is an attempt to redress the balance by
taking a hard look at one manifestation of our supposedly competitive
economy, the institution of advertising, and at one of its handmaidens, the
trade symbol.
and price of a heavily advertised cosmetic might justify withholding relief, "come the
millenium," see Boudjois Inc. v. Hermida Laboratories, Inc., 106 F.2d 174, 177 (C.C.A. 3d 1939).
158. For a discussion of possible misuse of trade symbols to divide markets, enforce price-
fixing agreements, etc., see Borchardt, Are Trade-Marks an Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245
(1943); Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEO. L.J. 113 (1944); Lockhart,
Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 507, 564 (1947).
The recent consent decree accepted by the A.B. Dick Co. includes a dedication of the trade-mark
"Mimeograph" to public use. U.S. v. A.B. Dick Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP., '48-'51 COURT
DEcISIONS 61,114, 62,233 (1948).
159. The new Act provides as one of seven defenses which prevent the conclusive use of the
mark in evidence, "that the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States." Trade-Mark Act § 33 (b)(7), 60 STAT. 427, 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051,
11 15(b)(7) (Supp. 1947). Whether the defense is limited to cases where the mark is asserted to be
incontestable, or whether it applies in all cases under the Act, will have to be determined by the
courts. As regards the ambiguous legislative history, compare ROBERT, NEv TRADE-MARK
MANUAL 205-11 (1947) with Lockhart, op. cit. supra note 158 at 566-8. The point will be further
discussed in a later article.
160. E.g., "There is no fetish in the word 'competition.' The invocation of equity rests more
vitally upon the unfairness." Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (C.C.A. 6th
1924), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926).
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We may relegate to a footnote technical questions of fraud, malice, and
intent,16' and still agree that shoddy tactics on the part of defendants may
have made many courts kinder to plaintiffs than the interests we have
analyzed would require. Generally, however, the judge, despite the
distractions of vice, keeps his eye on the plaintiff's case, or lack of it.62
Taking that case as we have charted it, with the public and the plaintiff
protected against any probable confusion caused by the defendant's tricks,
we may briefly measure the defendant's conduct against the same economic
standards we have applied to plaintiffs.
Consider the termites who have undermined the well-known brand
name, "Coca-Cola." The once impregnable position of this mark has been
shaken by the popular adoption of "cola" as the generic name descriptive
of the kind of drink,163 so that the First Circuit could recently hold that the
name "Polar Cola" on a similar beverage would [1204] not cause
confusion."6 We may assume, however, that it would dilute the still
formidable magnetism of the older mark. The defendant can use his
borrowed potency to conform, as nearly as may be, to the price-level made
possible by the successful differentiation of Coca-Cola. He may in addition
use the magic of the name to cloak an inferior product. Neither result would
be in the public interest. But he may equally, having access to the buying
public controlled by the name, offer an indistinguishable product at a lower
price.'65 The public would benefit. At the same time the monopoly price
commanded by the original differentiated product would become less
tenable, and in the cola field as a whole the possibility of achieving extreme
differentiation through advertising would decrease.
161. Proof of fraud as a foundation for an action is unnecessary in trade symbol cases. 3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 717 comment a. the defendant's motive is assumed to be to make
money, which is not condemned. See L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 193 Fed. 242, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1912), modified, 197 Fed. 534, 536 (C.C.A. 2d 1912), affd, 235 U.S. 88 (1914). His
intent, that is, whether his appropriation of plaintiff's symbol was deliberate or unwitting, is, as
has been mentioned, a somewhat perverse guide to the likelihood of confusion, note 129 supra;
and a finding of intent to appropriate is essential to the award of damages, but not to an injunction.
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 745.
162. For a controversy in which the court may have been unduly kind to the defendant, see
the nine years of litigation against one S.L. Stetson arising from the deceptive use of his name in
the hat business: John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson, 14 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1936),
modified 85 F.2d 586 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied 299 U.S. 605 (1936), contempt proceedings,
128 F.2d 981 (C.C.A. 2d 1942); 133 F.2d 129 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
163. Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (C.C.A. 4th 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 629 (1941); see 2 CALLMANN 1339; 27 VA. L. REV. 839 (1941).
164. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 162 F.2d 280 (C.C.A. Ist 1947), cert.
denied, 68 S. Ct. 110 (1947).
165. For instances of judicial recognition that a privileged copy was cheaper, see J.C. Penney
Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (C.C.A. 8th 1941) ("The record indicates that
defendant was able to retail its garments at approximately twenty cents less than those of plaintiff,
and this is perhaps the main root of plaintiff's grievance." Id. at 958); Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories v. Waldman, 69 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.Pa. 1946) (note 37 supra).
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Consider further the hypothetical case of a seller of hypodermic needles
who adopts a tradename "Coke," the alternative trade-mark of the Coca-
Cola Company. Assume that a court would not find the products
sufficiently related to warrant granting the Company an injunction. But
assume that the needle maker would attract to his product some of the
potency of the name. He may use it to differentiate his needle from its
competitors, and thus get a higher price than he otherwise could. No benefit
to the public results. But especially if his example is followed by makers of,
say, coconut candies, furnaces, and aniline dyes, who also adopt "Coke" as
a trade name, the advertising value of the symbol to all its users is
progressively diluted. Advertising differentiation becomes increasingly less
feasible, though interested buyers would have no difficulty in identifying
their purchases. In short, we may concede that the privileged imitator is
likely to use the symbol to differentiate his product from its competitors,
and thus get higher prices for it. But this is no more than what the plaintiff
has attempted. The upshot, from an economic point of view, is that we may
borrow an ancient legal symbol, and, labeling both parties in pari delicto,
leave them where we find them.16
Those to whom this sort of analysis is distasteful may find it so, among
other reasons, because they dislike imitators. Probably it is [1205] futile to
recall that we are all imitators, and that our society is committed to the
proposition that progress is advanced by the free use and adaptation of
novel things and ideas. In a famous trade name case, Justice Brandeis said,
"[Defendant] is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article
known as 'Shredded Wheat'; and thus is sharing in a market which
was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor and
has been widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising
persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of
an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a
right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested." 167
A limited number of limited monopolies is thought desirable, in the case of
patents to discourage true inventiveness, in the case of trade symbols to
reach certain goals we have been defining. To condemn possible solutions
because they favor free riders denies "the basic common law policy of
166. "A court of equity will leave these parties much as it would two poker players to collect
their debts as best they can and leave the public to its legal rights of law enforcement." James
Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 35 F. Supp. 169, 178 (E.D. Mich. 1940), aft'd,
128 F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 6th 1942) (appearance case; judgment for defendant).
167. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
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encouraging competition and the fact that the protection of monopolies in
names is but a secondary and limiting policy." 
168
I. CONCLUSION
In concluding, it will be observed that there is not a high degree of
correlation, in the field we have surveyed, between what the courts do and
(1) what the champions of advertising would like them so do, or (2) what
those who believe that persuasive advertising should make its way without
legal protection would like them to do. One reason for the shortcoming,
from the point of view of the latter group, is that the defendants in trade
symbol cases are not very handy champions of injured innocence. But the
main reason is the manifold nature of a trade symbol. As we have seen, it
may at once represent:
(1) the source of goods
(2) the reputation of that source
(3) satisfaction with the goods themselves
(4) persuasive advertising value
(5) intrinsic symbol value.
We have agreed that the first three are desirable private interests, entitled to
protection. The last two are not. But if they are all combined in a single
symbol, the degree of exclusive use permitted as a safeguard against
confusion of source, reputation, or goods, necessarily carries the rest along
with it.
[1206] The fact that the issue is not clear-cut, however, is no occasion
for deserting the field. Trade symbol cases are more than private matters of
tort liability and equity practice. Persistent claims are made on behalf of
advertising values which should be resisted. Every case requires decisions
that are matters of degree, on issues like confusion, identity of goods, and
markets, or the legitimacy of a symbol.'69 The scales are easily tipped
toward one set of values or another. Plaintiffs come into court with moral
accusations of unfair competition, which are in fact often aimed at the
elimination of competition. In trade name cases, particularly, "the doctrine
of so-called 'unfair competition' is really a doctrine of 'unfair intrusion on a
168. Frank, J., in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 959 (C.C.A. 2d
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943). See p. 1166 supra.
169. For a model of trial court analysis of a trade name problem, weighing all the relevant
legal and economic factors in the contest of the market in dispute, see the opinion of Wyzanski, J.,
in National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942) aft'd, 129
F.2d 848 (C.C.A. 1st 1942).
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monopoly."'"17 Plaintiffs also pose as champions of the consumer. But we
have seen that the consumer may have no concern in the advertising claims.
of either party. He is concerned with reducing the wastefulness of
persuasive advertising. The policy of the law is one way of expressing that
concern.
Finally, it may be worth pointing out that the views presented here are
conservative ones. They stem from a belief that less consumption of
advertising would mean more consumption of goods. They further assume
that in a free society the channels of competition should be kept open.
Immoderate regard for entrenched brand-name interests can freeze the
pattern of industries, as has probably happened in soap and cigarettes.
These views are conservative also in that they would preserve the basis for
judicial action in this area pretty much as it stands. Its historical foundation,
that "the wrong involved is diverting trade from the first user by misleading
customers who mean to deal with him" may be a narrow one, but its
limitations serve as a barrier to powerful pressures. In an acquisitive
society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a very powerful pressure.
Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the wheel, copyright the alphabet, and
register the sun and moon as exclusive trade-marks. It is true that the
restraining influence of the courts is largely passive. Withholding remedies
leaves persuasive advertising in the limbo of Sabbath-breaking and
gambling contracts. Whether any active measures are called for, and what
part the courts may have in enforcing them, is another story.
170. Frank, J., concurring in Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
My debt to the three opinions last cited will be recognized by anyone who has read them. Equally
apparent, perhaps, is my reliance on the long line of classic utterances by Judge Learned Hand in
this field, which have often established and always respected the limits of judicial law-making.
Finally, I gratefully acknowledge, since it is not at all apparent, that this paper has profited
immensely from the probing and polishing given it by my wife.
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